Wednesday, July 20, 2011

Define "outclassed"

From this article; I disagree with the following statement.

"Several key defence acquisition programs were deferred for many years. The first of the new submarines to replace the Collins class now is not scheduled to be operational until at least 2028 and some in government are favouring cheap, limited-capability European boats. These small vessels would be outclassed in the western Pacific in the 2030s and 40s."

A submarine that is available and works beats a fantasy super-sub dream with no industry capability to back it up; every time. A 212 being out-classed. That is an interesting theory.

Although I am interested in Mr. Babbage's definition of outclassed. Does he mean in the manner of how the F-35 will be outclassed in the Pacific Rim?

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19 comments:

Anonymous said...

Outclassed, the 212.
It does not have the range or endurance.
Could possibly defend Tasmania

ELP said...

Or contest and block the waters to the north. Something we currently cannot do with a few dock queens.

Anonymous said...

Hello!
Pardon my ignorance on subject of Australia international affairs. But which countries due to Australia military doctrine are perceived as potential foes? Especially when focusing on a naval warfare? I guess growing PRC military capabilities may cause some anxiety but PRC has none but potential adversaries along its borders. Some tensions with Indonesia maybe?
On the other hand has Australia ever considered the acquisition of nuclear powered subs? Nowadays it's not that technological challenge as it used to be. Moreover Russia for instance offers its assistance in developing such vessels (e.g. India, PRC, Brazil). It may sound like a pure fantasy but Australia exports uranium ore to Russia so after second thought it could be a feasible scenario.
Greetings from EU. Great blog.
Cheers!

Anonymous said...

"It does not have the range or endurance."

Type 212 boats have an advertised range of 8000nm or 12 weeks (84 days), whichever comes first.

WWII vintage Gato-class boats had a range of 11,000nm or 75 days, whichever comes first.

Collins class boats have a range of 11,000nm or 70 days, whichever comes first (assuming something doesn't break down first).

Is China more than 2000nm away from Australia? From Perth? From Darwin? I can believe that it might be that far away (by sea) from Adelaide though ... in which case you have to start wondering why anyone would want to put a sub base in Adelaide if the worry is about threats north of Brisbane and Darwin (or north of Alice Springs, for that matter).

Heretic

Anonymous said...

It has an endurance of three weeks.
Also have a look at videos of the interior.Would you like to be stuck in that space?

Crew is too small for long deployments.

Have a look at the atlas and look at the distances to northern Asia.
China is along way more than 2000 miles from Fremantle, or Darwin.(that is where the subs are, Freemnatle), and it is the only stategic place to put them.
That is where the USA based 70 subs in WW2.
Also the availabilty of the 212 etc also has problems.Same as . Chinese and Indian subs worse, far worse.

Anonymous said...

Would you live in this for three weeks let alone more?
Just think how you would feel living in a small caravan.
For the Pacific, ridiculous.
For Europe and the Atlantic, excellent.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNeHyM4q0pg&feature=player_embedded
(Video originall posted by ELP on previos site)

Atticus said...

ELP and others, Submarine Warfare is Offensive, not defensive.

1) The Submarine is involved in Recon of the coast of the potential enemy/enemy. It gathers geospatial information and electronic information, fleet movements, aircraft movements etc. Please study the most recent conflict being the Falklands War. A type 212 does not cut it.
2) Submarines are involved in mine laying off the ports of the enemy. Australia’s potential foes are a long way away. Please study WW2 and the efforts laying mines off the ports of Vietnam, Taiwan etc.
3) Anti-shipping should be conducted close to enemy ports as it shuts them down in conjunction with mine laying. Would you wait until the shipping turned up on your coast? Terrify the shit out of them.
4) Special Forces. Again study WW2, Australia inserted Special Forces a long way from the 200 mile limit. Try Singapore and further North.
5) Anti Submarine Warfare. Again do it off the port of your enemy, not off your own coast.

The 212 has an advertised range of 12,800 KM.
The Yellow Sea is 9000 km one way from Fremantle, the Japanese Basin 10,600km.
The travel time to the Yellow Sea would be 18 days each way. That is 36 days with no time on station. That is 5 weeks. A lot longer than the three weeks endurance advertised.
In a conflict in the Pacific can you guarantee anything regarding refuelling etc. NO. Life is full of “surprises”. Study history.
In addition you could not put 30 people in a small sub like the 212 for more than three weeks or you would need a need the loony bin when they got back.
As stated I believe the 212 is probably one of the best Submarines available, but not for what is required in this region.

ELP said...

Certainly the Collins mistake doesn't work for this region.

I prefer something that actually works as opposed to a fantasy money pit.

As for the living quarters; subs are cramped; get over it.

Atticus said...

The only mistake is the inability of DMO to manage anything.Sack them and put REAL Project Magers in Charge.

The people that built the machine knew what they were doing,(they were after all German)and I am not talking about Kochums.
Read "The Collins Class Submarine Story", Peter Yule and Dereck Woolner, aademic, not biased.
The 212 can not work.

"1) The Submarine is involved in Recon of the coast of the potential enemy/enemy. It gathers geospatial information and electronic information, fleet movements, aircraft movements etc. Please study the most recent conflict being the Falklands War. A type 212 does not cut it.
2) Submarines are involved in mine laying off the ports of the enemy. Australia’s potential foes are a long way away. Please study WW2 and the efforts laying mines off the ports of Vietnam, Taiwan etc.
3) Anti-shipping should be conducted close to enemy ports as it shuts them down in conjunction with mine laying. Would you wait until the shipping turned up on your coast? Terrify the shit out of them.
4) Special Forces. Again study WW2, Australia inserted Special Forces a long way from the 200 mile limit. Try Singapore and further North.
5) Anti Submarine Warfare. Again do it off the port of your enemy, not off your own coast.

The 212 has an advertised range of 12,800 KM.
The Yellow Sea is 9000 km one way from Fremantle, the Japanese Basin 10,600km.
The travel time to the Yellow Sea would be 18 days each way. That is 36 days with no time on station. That is 5 weeks. A lot longer than the three weeks endurance advertised.
In a conflict in the Pacific can you guarantee anything regarding refuelling etc. NO. Life is full of “surprises”. Study history.
In addition you could not put up to 27 people in a small sub like the 212 for more than three weeks or you would need a need the loony bin when they got back.
As stated I believe the 212 is probably one of the best Submarines available, but not for what is required in this region.

Also please view that Left wing Organisation's (SBS)series the "Submariner" to understand how big the Pacific is and the problems you have.

You cannot expect a crew of 22 to 27 to undertake extended missions,(apart from the fact it does not have the range) which is why the Collins now carries abot 60 up from 44 odd.
Get ovet it

ELP said...

The Collins class program is a complete failure. If we learn anything from it, that would be to get real subs that work; off the shelf.

Atticus said...

Stick to what you know, ie the F35, and you are doing a good job.THANKS.
However the Collins is not a failure, the DMO is a failure.Read the Book!
When real Project Mangagers become involved after the next review we will see results.
There are other benefits, ie economic and the fact that you can maintain them locally.eg
http://www.dbi.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/297527/Inquiry-into-Naval-Shipbuilding.pdf

Here is another consideration,in any case ,as you were not here in the 1970,s.
France,the Mirage, Sweeden the Carl Gustav, Germany, various, cut off all support for the weapon systems sold to Autralia because of our involvement in the Vietnam war. Imagine, your Airforce bereft of spare parts etc.
Get over it.

Atticus said...

Sorry, Sweden.Spelling.
Also imagine the political pressure on Germany from China if a conflict arose?
How would you get an oil change and tune up then?
Same as Taiwan are experincing with spares for their Mirages at the moment?France playing silly buggers again!

ELP said...

Well if that is true then there are no subs all the way around. Depending on the rent-seeking class who are experts at ruining home-grown sub fantasies is a non-solution.

Anonymous said...

<<A 212 being out-classed. That is an interesting theory.

you wouldn't get a 212. it's not for export. the 214 is.the key difference is (probably) an enchanced AIP and some special rubber coating of the surface to dampen the noise (says on wiki).

it is true however that it is rather small for the needs of australia and therefore not the best choice.

Anonymous said...

What Atticus is saying is right.

A close study of the Collins saga shows this is the case.

DMO senior management immersed in the environment of the Defence Portfolio continues to be the problem.

And the AWD is on the same death spiral. Look who sits on top of the program as the head of the supposed oversight function - the Alliance Board.

None other than Mr Mick Roche - the former Undersecretary of the Defence Materiel Organisation (USDM) who is responsible for setting up the whole DMO trainwreck that Dr Steve Gumley was unable to manage, let alone turn around.

Bushranger 71 said...

It is not in Australia's national interest to go poking around in submarines within China's perceived First Island Chain; which would be more likely than anything else to aggravate our foreign and commercial relationships.

Just as British hegemony outlived its welcome in the Far East, it is now time for the US to recognise they cannot any longer justify exercise of primacy in South East Asia and world stability would benefit if they withdrew militarily to their Pacific Ocean territories.

Even the flawed DWP2009 emphasizes need for Australian military capabilities suited for operations in our 'near neighbourhood'; so Type 212/214 boats would probably be very adequate.

Like with LPDs, AWDs, Wedgetail, JSF; our defence planners have ultra-expensive delusions of grandeur regarding another home-built submarine. The overall unaffordable project cost, projected at around $36billion, would probably ultimately exceed the combined costs of the dubious merit 4 other projects mentioned.

Our political and military leaders need to take a much overdue reality check.

Atticus said...

Ah, Bushranger, where do you think our submarines, from the Oberon on poke around, and have done so and are still doing so.And even as we post?
There is no problem as they have not found one yet, and will not for the foreseeable future.
The Collins has an indescretion of 15 to 30 minutes a day.
Read the previous posts regarding what submarines really do.
You cannot find a submarine off the coast of a continent like Australia with a few short range 212/214s. Where do you look?
We cannot even find a refugee boat over 200km between Indonesia nad Christmas Island.
Do you really think apeasment works with China?

Goldeel1 said...

Bushranger, if its not in our national interest to go poking around in China self styled five island chain as it may rankle them, then exactly what gives them the right to send there own submarines all along our coastline for the last 30 or so years? And YES we know they have been doing it. There is a well known local story in Wollongong of a fishing boat that struck an underwater object and sank later identified as a submarine of probable Chinese origin in the early 80's. have a few drinks sometime with some old submariners and Im sure a few things will slip out.

Bushranger 71 said...

Hi Atticus, Goldeel1. I can remember most of WW2 and the loss of 30 plus ships around our coastline, mostly due to enemy submarine activity. Was also involved in attempting photography of a submarine with Russian insignia that surfaced close to a lighthouse in Victoria during the early 1960s. And, I am aware of what RAN submarines do since. The real issue is the relevance of submarines for Australia in the strategic scenario existing today.

Intelligence gathering by foreign submarines around the Australian continent is hardly worth the effort as the country is so easily entered by legal means with a wide open back door to NZ and military infrastructure and activity within Australia is very transparent. Foreign submarine activity might become a concern if it interferes with sea corridors to apply political pressure; hence the desirability of upgraded ISR capabilities including adequate long range ASW potential.

Like it or not, we are really a pissant nation with limited defence spending potential considering overall national economic imperatives. Arguably, the public at large will also be less inclined to support involvements in far away military activities once we extricate from Afghanistan and perhaps downscale Middle East commitments.

Our more immediate area of prospective military interest is the regional wet tropics archipelago about 2,000 nautical miles either side of Longitude 145E, with the US fortress Guam being about centre and same distance from Darwin as is Canberra. It is arguably primarily within this region that we need an adequate submarine capability.

Multiple Navy colleagues advise expertise has been flooding out of the RAN and its diabolical status is coming into focus. The question arises how will the Service be able to cope with AWDs, LPDs, MRH90, MH-60R and an enlarged submarine force? We need to be realistic about what is achievable and 6 proven boats, like Type 212/214, would probably be adequate. 12 home-built vessels at an outrageous unaffordable estimated project cost of $36billion would generate other military capability gaps due to foreseeable budgetary constraints.