Public Defence Capability Plans (DCP) like the one updated recently (PDF) are specific and vague at the same time.
Take the AIR6000 F-35 New Air Combat Capability for Australia.
In the DCP the first 3 squadrons show an acquisition of around $10B for 72 aircraft.
Life of type for this platform is expected to be 30 years. Initial operating capability is expected to be 2019-2020--8-10 years late depending on which story you believe from 2002.
Through-life support will be provided by Lockheed Martin's Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment (ALGS) system using a performance-based logistics approach. This system was mentioned as high-risk in a 2011 U.S. DOD audit.
The plan is to embed Australian industry in the JSF global supply and support chain for the life of the program under the LM's ‘best value’ industry model. ‘Best value’ is determined by the prime contractors through international competition.
Defence F-35 advocates have always wanted a 4th squadron bringing the total number of aircraft up to 100. Initial operating capability for this squadron is expected to be 2023-24.
To give you one illustration of the impact of repeat F-35 program delays over the years, in 2007 (PDF), it was expected that Australia would acquire 3 F-35 squadrons up to 2015 (delivery is usually 2 years after order) and all 100 would have been ordered by 2018.
The DCP expects that the 4th squadron, including more facilities and infrastructure improvement along with block upgrades, could cost $5-10B.
Another phase of the program expects to pay $500M-$1B on weapons.
This means that the new air combat capability for the F-35 (according to the DCP) could cost between $15.5B to $21B.
Yet, there is more.
This project though has another interesting over-spend attached to the Australian tax payer. That is $6.6B for the 24 Super Hornets, along with an additional projection of another $500M-$1B for Super Hornet and F-35 weapons.
Then there is the small handful of billions to upgrade the legacy Hornet fleet--again, because of delays to the F-35 program.
See where this is going? North of $30B.
The cost estimates coming out of Defence have always been fuzzy.
The bigger picture is the loss of Australian regional air supremacy.
12 comments:
Hello Eric,
That's a good one what you said about the F-35 is a fifth-generation failure on defense.aol.com.
In fact we can all say that to the Australian Aviation website, DoD Buzz etc to stir up the F-35 advocates to give them a very hard time.
Regards Peter
You can go on YouTube and type in 1/5 DOCUMENTRY ON F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER, Military expert Pierre Sprey, the founder and designer of the F-16 & A-10 Warthog aircraft, Explains the samething why the F-35 will not cut it on the modern battlefield.
Take no notice of the dutch subtitles, Pierre is interviewing I think the Dutch news reporter.
Regards Peter
What upgrades to classic Hornet have been made due to F-35 delays?
Not HUG phase 2.
How much has been saved by retiring the F-111? How much of a dent does that make in the $6.6B Super Hornet figure?
Where's the line in the sand between money v capability?
If AIR6000 had been run properly, as opposed to being cut off and going after the undeveloped F-35, many HUG jobs wound not have been needed. Had AIR6000 been run properly (involving a competition of existing and proven aircraft) a lot of HUG work would have been un-needed.
The justifications for the Super Hornet were made after the fact of a snap decision by Nelson and at that time, discussion was already active a month before with politicians questioning Defence leadership, what to do about F-35 delays.
Giving up the F-111 was a loss in capability when considering:
That the only failed wing test was an a bad setup.
The F-111 could be carried out to 2020s with existing logistics support in place.
F-111 could have easily been upgraded with J-weapons.
I suppose this is about the time that some will say F-111s needed escort. Depends on the scenario, and if it is an anti-access scenario, the F-35 and Super would need "escorts"; called F-22s.
The Contents listing for the DCP2012 document clearly indicates that it is a defence industry policy and not aimed at maintaining continual adequate and credible military preparedness.
The planners are still blindly aiming toward downstream mythical force capabilities thus continuing to create capability gaps and are really shrinking Australia's military capacity.
Little hope for commonsense to emerge when both of the major political parties seem to be singing from the same song book. It should not be forgotten that the Howard Government decided to acquire Abrams tanks, LPD aircraft carriers, Tiger and MRH90 helicopters, among other dubious merit platforms.
FY07 should have been the year to have strategically assessed the F-35 as simply being unsustainable and unacceptably risky on the down-years.
In that year, instead of ordering the F-18F (basically a shorter-ranged and lesser-equipped, Transonic F-15E capability), RAAF should have made the strategic plunge and just piggy-backed along with SG in committing to order 75 F-15AU-specific next-gen platform replacement (to replace F-111 at first and then incrementally, the F/A-18 -- rather than upgrading the hornets).
The back half of the F/A-18 replacements could have been made with some variant of the -SE, or perhaps a jointly-developed single-seat, further modernized variant.
This plan would have been more affordable in the end, delivered more certain capability (at least for the first 15 years, whilst entering into the most uncertain times in post-cold-war period) and would have been more reliable.
Australian Aviation Industry could have gained via tech-share, receiving off-sets and sub-assembly work. Logistical support could have been further built upon with a robustly-negotiated strategic Boeing partnership.
As far as what's going on for RCAF and RAAF... Eric is right... expect certain additional, highly-risky and previously unexpected Hornet Upgrade requirements and further life-extension work having to be tacked onto flat out unsustainable and soon to be over-taxed TACAIR budgets!
Either that, or concede unprecedented capability-gaps and deterrence-gaps through at least 2025.
p.s.
It's unlikely (imho) that RAAF will be able to afford or ultimately desire to procure the full 75 F-35A units (let alone 100).
One could contemplate a max of around 50x F-35 jets being acquired (with the original birds eventually being retrofitted to block-V standard at excessive cost), deciding to retain the F-18F for the long-haul and then balance out the mix with unmanned platforms (perhaps a mix of props and jet-powered UCAV).
Hello again Eric,
"That the only failed wing test was an a bad setup".
Former Air Commander Peter Criss had his former colleagues from DSTO during the maintenance test they accidently broke the F-111's wing during testing which they set the wing up incorrectly I've heard.
Regards Peter
To Anonymous at 7:28 AM
"In that year, instead of ordering the F-18F (basically a shorter-ranged and lesser-equipped, Transonic F-15E capability), RAAF should have made the strategic plunge and just piggy-backed along with SG in committing to order 75 F-15AU-specific next-gen platform replacement (to replace F-111 at first and then incrementally, the F/A-18 -- rather than upgrading the hornets)".
Actually "TacairStationHQ" from YouTube said the samething when I was watching the F-15C demo at Avalon Air Show 2007.
First of all, replace the F/A-18A/B Hornets with the specialized F-15E+ development program... the F-15AU or a jointly-developed single-seat, a further modernized variant for the AIR 6000 Hornet replacement program which is a fantastic idea.
Instead, I rather upgrade the F-111fleet such as
1. J-weapon series, AIM-9X Sidewinder or AIM-132 ASRAAM and AIM-120 AMRAAM AAMs (not to tackle enemy fighters, but for air-to-air intercepter like the Tornado ADV and MiG-31BM Foxhound type role).
2. APG-80 AESA radar,
3. Supercruising F119-PW-100 engines with a modified conventional afterburning nozzles, or F110-GE-132 engines.
4. DEWS (Digital Electronic Warfare System) or defensible EWSP jammers.
5. NG (Next Generation) 3-D touch screen cockpit display.
6. JHMCS for the pilot and navigator to cue sensors and advanced short range AAMs.
The F-111 is extremely difficult aircraft to replace in the strike bombing role. The aircraft could be carried out to 2020s or beyond with existing logistics support in place. A high-end force of advanced F-15s and F-111s for example offers a better promise of a 90%+ common high-end long range aircraft fleet and gives the RAAF over 50% of its greater punch.
Also acquire some CAS (Close Air Support) aircraft like the A-10 or other type to equip with No.76SQN.
You can read the article about Why Australia Should Retain Its F-111 Fleet on Air Power Australia.
Regards Peter
F-15AU's, super cruising F-111's with AESA, 76SQN getting A-10's.
Better ring the government, there are more experts here than in Russell!
Excellent idea Knucklehead.
We might get more professional
Hey Peter,
That proposal you put out there above, wouldn't likely have been such an invalid or unsustainable alternative plan in the end. (Compared to what reality is being faced with RAAF now, going forward in the medium/long-term).
And btw, I appreciate the reference to TSHQ on the noted YT vid :)
Very impressed, as I truly have had no known contact with you...
Cheers-
Post a Comment