Eric Palmer blog

Harvest Hawk PGM containers

2012-02-24T18:13:00.000+11:00

Now this is cool. And will be very useful for persistent low intensity ops. I am a huge fan of the multi-functional KC-130J.

Keeping the F-35 PR machine flying

2012-02-24T18:06:00.001+11:00

It is that time of year; where the DOD and the Hill argue over budgets.

The F-35 program needs public relations. Badly.

What to do? Perform some photo shoots for the A and B model showing dummy missiles, real racks and pylons.

Here is the latest including the missionized gun pod shape.

One could be forgiven for thinking these are warplanes and the program is making significant progress. They would be mistaken.

It is interesting to note that any LRIP aircraft done before batch 6 are junk. They do not have the hardware to drive the final Block 3 software.

Then there are those problems.

Which might not see a fix until LRIP-8.

And at what price and actual worth?

A non-solution, solution for arrogant USAF leadership

2012-02-23T21:14:00.000+11:00

How can the United States Air Force field the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter before 2020?

It is a fair question since the one constant is program delay and cost growth.

I propose the following if the USAF is so intent on fielding a mediocrity.

1. Write up a requirement to have a HUD put in the aircraft. Not very joint, but we are talking about survival.

2. Write up a requirement that the first IOC squadron will be used for Air Sovereignty missions or ASA. Something the USAF recently renamed because they were continually embarrassed by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) on their inability to properly resources and manage home air defense.

This requirement would be for the HUD, the AIM-9X on the outside pylon and the gun. There you go. A squadron that can do home defense out of somewhere not too hot and not near very much water (where one risks dumping the aircraft when the unreliable IPP fails). Hill AFB, Utah will do.

3. Write up a requirement for another squadron (also at Hill). It will have the HUD and will only be able to drop JDAMs from the internal bays (in a F-117-like release profile).

4. Weight savings. Remove the DAS cameras and EOTs.

About all these 2 squadrons will be able to do is gather data in a permanent IOC like state for a follow-on design.

Real weight savings and any hope of reliability will not happen until USAF writes up a requirement for a D model. This aircraft will have a different motor which doesn´t suffer the 2000 pounds of dead weight from the STOVL design. The D will also need a more reliable power system to avoid IPP woes. Hint: the F-16 has some answers.

That will not fix all the woes with the USAF and the F-35 program, but it will give them what they want. An illusion of using your money for something useful; even if they are wasting it.

Rudderless

2012-02-22T06:55:00.001+11:00

Let us look at Defence and their poor thinking.

Defence Minister Stephen Smith does not plan to proceed with a scheduled decision on the purchase of another 58 Joint Strike Fighters valued at almost $6 billion this calendar year.

Because there is no such thing as a go-to-war configured F-35 at that price. Maybe one will be available for evaluation in 2020? 2022? Never?

"The government is not delivering on its 2009 Defence White Paper commitments," Australian Strategic Policy Institute budgetary analyst Mark Thompson said.

Because the 2009 White Paper was a stupid joke.

He said savings under the strategic reform program had been exaggerated, capability planning was unrealistic, Defence's long-term plans were unaffordable and further budget cuts were to be expected in May as the government sought its ''holy grail'' of a 2013 budget surplus.

And we should not be surprised given the deskilled thinking available in quantity.

Mr Smith, who fears delays in the JSF program could leave Australia with an air-warfare capability gap, said he was more focused on what would happen with the first 14 planes - only two of which Australia is contractually obliged to take - than the second tranche right now.

Yet no one seems to have the balls to say that those two jets will be worthless junk.

He is due to receive a submission from the Defence Materiel Organisation on the next 58 JSFs, the so-called ''second tranche'', around September or October

Why? Any "analysis" by that crew will be faulty; by virtue of their performance.

Wasting more of your money

2012-02-22T06:31:00.001+11:00

Experts said that was likely to translate into a decision to upgrade at least six of the new 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet fleet to advanced electronic warfare variants.

The federal government had 12 Super Hornets hard-wired on the assembly line for possible conversion as EA-18G Growlers - a move that would give the air force a formidable new capability unmatched in the Asia-Pacific.

Not really.

Minister for Defence Materiel - Address to the Australian Defence Magazine Congress

2012-02-21T18:36:00.001+11:00

A captive and friendly audience is what meets the DMO for the address to the Australian Defence Magazine (read-Defence cheerleaders) Congress.

The following quote from the full address below is stunning:

¨Take the Collins Class subs, it’s quite clear that there were problems, there were mistakes, and there are of course many challenges ahead, but no nation, no matter how advanced, expects to deliver complex projects without controversy. We simply should not forget that the Pentagon was once derided for thinking that computer systems actually had a place in the military hardware; that the Humvee, the M1 Abrams, the Black Hawk were all criticised in their time. And I can recall the Bushmaster here was heavily criticised in the early days and it may well have come to the point where it was closed down. But today would anyone argue that it has saved lives for Australians for many years?¨

Comparing the Collins disaster to the Humvee, the M1 and the Blackhawk. Good luck with that. Those platforms when fielded actually delivered value. The Collins has done no such thing. The Bushmaster? Great program. Great vehicle But here is the other part of the story. In the beginning, the entrenched Defence bureaucracy wrote such a poor performance contract, that when there were problems early on, Defence was near powerless to do much except sit, watch and hope it worked out. Pretty much their standard procedure with procurement management.

Then this:

¨Now, there’s a view in some quarters, and I read it in The Financial Review on a regular basis, that these are all decisions that simply come down to the bottom line in next year’s budget. Frankly, I don’t think that’s the message the Australian people pursue. I think the Australian people are tired of small mindedness. They are sick of hearing that other countries are better, are cheaper or are smarter. They want to believe that this is a country that can do great things for its troops and for the people they defend.´

No. The public is long tired of gross incompetence in places like the failed experiment known as the DMO along with other known associates promoted way beyond their skill level.

This kind of gathering is music for rent-seekers who lobby for more Defence waste. And what real value does Defence provide at $27B per year? Not much. The organisation needs a hair cut of about $10B for what little it provides.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for the opportunity to be with you today, it’s a great pleasure.

Some two months into the job I thought this would be an opportunity to share with you a few of my early reflections. I’m the 29th Minister to hold the Defence Procurement Portfolio since 1939. What I have discovered in these first two months is just how much attention the Defence community pays to this issue of legacy, and it is the case in my circumstance where I’ve taken on what might we describe as the legacy of 28 predecessors. And some, of course, have had more profound legacies than others. But I’m not really here today to talk to you about others’ legacies; I’m here today to talk about our legacy.

I believe that we have to face up to our responsibilities, to our legacy to future generations. This financial year the DMO will spend more than $10B and every day Australian Defence personnel stake their lives on the quality of the equipment that we provide. So our decisions shape the lives of real people but, however, it’s not just the lives of Defence personnel that we’re talking about and it’s not just the lives of the 27,000 people that work in the local Defence industries. More broadly, our decisions help determine what skills, what technologies, what industrial capabilities this country will take well into the next century.

So, all of this begs the question, “What are we trying to achieve?” Defence procurement is not simply about buying modern weapons; it’s very much part of developing a modern country. So I face this job on the basis of asking myself, “What sort of country will we be defending in years to come?”, “What are we as a people capable of achieving?”

Now, there’s a view in some quarters, and I read it in The Financial Review on a regular basis, that these are all decisions that simply come down to the bottom line in next year’s budget. Frankly, I don’t think that’s the message the Australian people pursue. I think the Australian people are tired of small mindedness. They are sick of hearing that other countries are better, are cheaper or are smarter. They want to believe that this is a country that can do great things for its troops and for the people they defend.

So I say we can. I say we should be ambitious. We want the best equipment we can afford and we want to be the best at supplying it. Now, those of you who know me well from another role know that I’m very much in favour of buying Australian. I wear this badge consciously. But it’s not a question of buying Australian at any price or on any terms, and this is a point I cannot stress enough. I’m not in the business of defending second best and, from all of my dealings with industry; I don’t believe that you are either. And that’s why we together must strive for excellence.

Now, we have no trouble arguing the case that we build world-class schools, that we will build world-class universities, we’re building the MBM, we’re modernising our tax system and we are shifting to clean technology. We have no trouble arguing that because we are a creative and a clever people. And so I say why shouldn’t we support our troops by investing in ourselves?

Take the Collins Class subs, it’s quite clear that there were problems, there were mistakes, and there are of course many challenges ahead, but no nation, no matter how advanced, expects to deliver complex projects without controversy. We simply should not forget that the Pentagon was once derided for thinking that computer systems actually had a place in the military hardware; that the Humvee, the M1 Abrams, the Black Hawk were all criticised in their time. And I can recall the Bushmaster here was heavily criticised in the early days and it may well have come to the point where it was closed down. But today would anyone argue that it has saved lives for Australians for many years?

So we shouldn’t judge our achievements on the basis of popular prejudice. Collins subs are, as I’m often told, for complexity on a par with the space shuttle. We forget how ambitious the goal was at the time, largely because we have lost sight of how far we’ve actually moved along the line to be able to produce equipment of this scale and this complexity.

As late as the 1980’s we were reliant on the Abram Class submarines built in the United Kingdom, yet we developed the capabilities at home to upgrade them and we developed the skills to use them. And that laid the foundations for the Collins build program.

Now, whatever your views on the program, it has delivered one of the largest conventional submarines in the world, and for Australia I believe that has developed a unique capability for our needs. So we should not even contemplate, that when it comes to the question of the Future Subs, that it will be a long journey. And that we should be ambitious for what this country can produce.

And I don’t want for a moment to forget how tough the conditions have been or they’re likely to remain. It’s important to remember a few basic facts. We are a small nation with the world’s third largest maritime territory to secure. We are a great trading nation. Our prosperity rests upon our capacity to keep our shipping lanes open. Ninety-nine percent of all our trade is by sea, and we simply cannot rely upon someone else to do all the jobs that we can’t do ourselves. We cannot leave our security to the whim of the market. We must be willing to achieve great things. And if we have the ambition this government is about building the conditions to realise that ambition.

Now, as I read it, this is very much what DMO’s mission’s all about. They are here to support people who support our troops and I want to assure you they want to work with industry to get the right equipment and the right capabilities together. And that’s, for instance, if we take the example that’s been developed with a priority industry capability health checks. This is a government and industry working together to monitor and build our strength strategically. And today I’m releasing two further health checks covering the Signature Management and the Mission Critical Software Systems and they’ll be available on the DMO website.

Our second example is our reforms to the ship maintenance arrangements, and over the service life of our fleets the total investment in the sustainment can be double or triple the original purchase price of any particular unit. And a lot of that work has to be done in Australia. And it’s a long term need requiring long term investments in capabilities. For that reason, the old sustainable model, I think the sustainment model cannot meet that need and so it’s been changed. The burden of industry suppliers to our larger ships is to bid in the past on the basis of each and every maintenance activity will be a thing of the past. Longer term contracts are the way of the future, to provide the incentives for the investment’s company need in their own capabilities.

And we’ll bring down the administrative costs and we’ll help raise the incentive for our suppliers, as I say, to invest in their own future.

The new arrangements are being rolled out for the ANZAC frigates first, with the FFG fleet to follow, and the next five year contract for the ANZAC fleet is expected to deliver cost savings in that way of between 10% and 15% over the current arrangement.

The government hopes to be able to make an announcement on this contract in the very near future. This is also the contract model for, that Defence may use for the landing helicopter docking ships and the air warfare destroyers.

It’s a new approach, an approach that’s good for industry, it’s good for our navy and it’s good for the Australian taxpayers.

Now, that’s the sort of legacy I think we can all be proud of to build if we simply have the courage to pay our part. Thank you very much.

More delay for Australia's F-35 fantasy

2012-02-21T15:58:00.001+11:00

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A new day, and Smith is still poorly advised about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter:

Mr Smith says the US has devoted so much to this project that in the end it will be successful.

"The first risk from our perspective in my view has always been capability gap, by the scheduling. Secondly, of course there is a unit cost risk as well," he said.

Mr Smith says Australia has been sensible from the outset in opting only for the conventional landing and takeoff JSF variant.

1. He has no proof that it will be successful. The program is riddled with problems; is not affordable; and is light years away from showing a go-to-war configuration; if ever.

2. And, who told him that; implying that things are so much better because Australia opted for the conventional landing and take off variant?

I smell a rat.

“It’s about $37 million for the CTOL aircraft, which is the air force variant.”
- Colonel Dwyer Dennis, U.S. JSF Program Office brief to Australian journalists, 2002-

". . . US$40 million dollars . . "
-Senate Estimates/Media Air Commodore John Harvey, AM Angus Houston, Mr Mick Roche, USDM, 2003-

" . . US$45 million in 2002 dollars . ."
-JSCFADT/Senate Estimates, Air Commodore John Harvey, Mr Mick Roche, USDM, 2003/2004-

". . average unit recurring flyaway cost of the JSF will be around US$48 million, in 2002 dollars . . "
-Senate Estimates/Press Club Briefing, Air Commodore John Harvey, 2006

". . the JSF Price (for Australia) - US$55 million average for our aircraft . . in 2006 dollars . ."
-Senate Estimates/Media AVM John Harvey ACM Angus Houston, Nov. 2006-

“…DMO is budgeting around A$131 million in 2005 dollars as the unit procurement cost for the JSF. .”
-AVM John Harvey Briefing, Office of the Minister for Defence, May 2007-

“There are 108 different cost figures for the JSF that I am working with and each of them is correct”
-Dr Steve Gumley, CEO of the DMO, Sep./Oct. 2007-

“…I would be surprised if the JSF cost us anymore than A$75 million … in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92”
-JSCFADT Dr Steve Gumley, CEO DMO, July 2008-

". . Dr Gumley's evidence on the cost of the JSF was for the average unit recurring flyaway cost for the Australian buy of 100 aircraft . ."
-JSCFADT/Media AVM John Harvey, Aug. 2008-

Confirmed previous advice i.e. A$75 million in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92,
-JSCFADT Dr Steve Gumley, CEO of the DMO, Sep. 2009-

" ...about $77 million per copy."
-Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Feb. 2008.

Captive carry tests

2012-02-21T12:46:00.003+11:00

The F-35 testers performed a flight with some external racks and AIM-9 shapes.

A few points. This is just a normal phase of the test program to get good data on captive carry flight performance. Not a big deal.

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Or is it?

At this time there is no way to weaponeer stores. The avionics along with the helmet system are faulty. Once they figure that out ( I am voting for a HUD ), then we may have a less galactically stupid way forward with this failed program.

When they get to stores release it should be fun and full of discovery.

I love the temporary fix for not cooking the horizontal stabs when using sustained after-burner.

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Stealthy.

CF-18 refurb a poor idea

2012-02-20T13:58:00.000+11:00

The idea that CF-18s would run out of life by 2020 wasn't much news to us that actually take the time to study the issue.

Funny how the issue is just now appearing in the media.

Slow.

As I have mentioned before, the F-35 is disqualified as a CF-18 replacement for any number of reasons but also, time.

It will be the 2020s before any intelligent purchaser of military equipment can evaluate the F-35 for their air arm. That is, if the program lasts that long.

There is also significant confusion on refurbishment (or what defines refurbishment) for a CF-18.

The CF-18 and the F-16 were designed as part of a light-weight fighter design. The goal was to build up affordable fighter aircraft in-number to face the Soviet threat.

The CF-18 and F-16 are not "depot-jets" like the F-15. In other words, the F-15 was designed to fly x amount of hours and then go into deep maintenance every 5-7 years, then put back into the field. I have seen the F-15 depot process first hand.

The CF-18 and F-16 were meant to be flown x amount of hours and then thrown into the trash. Of the two, the F-16 is easier to extend life on. Wing flex, forward bulkhead corrosion and various fittings have to be replaced.

The CF-18 (or all classic Hornets) require many things in refurbishment. There is the center-barrel replacement. This is the area of the fuselage where the wings and landing-gear are located. This part of the jet is disassembled and then you look to see how bad things are. Each barrel replacement is a custom job as each jet has different levels of corrosion and wear.

Barrel replacement started out as a one-off fluke. Years ago a new F-18C was wrecked. Someone decided if they changed the barrel and some other things, they could put the aircraft back into action.

Today that process has turned into a small production line. Depending on who does it (places like Jacksonville, Florida) or up in Canada, it can take up to a year to perform.

And this doesn't count for all the other areas that need to be refurbished that don't include the barrel; wing corrosion fixes being one.

And as one can see in this 2007 Australian example: ministers and politicians can get a might confused over the process.

"Dr Nelson said modified aircraft would regain 100 per cent of their fatigue life, giving up to nine years' additional service life."

Well, there you go.

Refurbishing CF-18s (again) to make them last past 2020 is a fool's errand. But try telling these people such a thing.

"Defence experts have been pushing the government since last fall to consider a further upgrade to the CF-18s.

Retired air force lieutenant-colonel Dean Black has said it's something that should be considered rather than going down the road of Australia buying new Super Hornets, the beefed up version of the F-18."

Sorry, I am not seeing him as a "defence expert" on this topic. Think flight envelope restriction (by airframe) and an operational scheduling mess (only airframes xs to xy can carry this amount of weight or push x amount of g's).

End the stupidity.

The only solution is for Canada to stop and begin a tender process for the CF-18 replacement.

Any other solution is irresponsible.

DND boss expressed worries to U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee chair

2012-02-19T16:26:00.001+11:00

It is tough to be DND minister Mackay. Some people are so arrogant they will do anything not to be proven wrong.

See this Canadian article (Google translate: French-to-English).

MacKay has openly pleaded with U.S. Senator McCain claiming that the F-35 is the only solution for Canada. It is unfortunate that all this time, MacKay has been so poorly advised by his staff.

Ottawa- Fearing political fallout from the release of Republican Senator John McCain against cost overruns associated with construction of the F-35, Defence Minister Peter MacKay called the American politician, last June, to sing the praises of this device that wish to buy Canada, the United States and other allies.

The call from the Minister MacKay occurred about two weeks after striking the statements of Senator McCain before the committee of the Senate Armed Services to study the viability of the purchase of these stealth aircraft to be built by U.S. firm Lockheed Martin.

Mr. McCain has specifically stated that the Pentagon should abandon the acquisition program of approximately 2400 units given the explosion of construction costs and failures in the development of these devices.

Another problem is Canada has to stick to a rigid budget based on erroneous assumptions like this:

In Canada, the Harper government maintains that it will pay on average $ 75 million per aircraft. It then plans to spend $ 7 billion for aircraft maintenance for two decades. But many believe that the unit cost will be much higher - from 110 to 135 million.

Based on current USAF costing issues, Canada will be luck to afford 20 jets. And what they buy will be riddled with mistakes.

Or, they can come up with a credible plan-B. I wonder if MacKay has read this letter?

Solutions

2012-02-19T12:07:00.000+11:00

MOD's £38b 'black hole' almost balanced

Now that there is little left. In order to save the village, we had to destroy it?

USAFs F-35 procurement plan is not believable

2012-02-18T09:43:00.001+11:00

United States Air Force (USAF) aircraft FY2013 procurement numbers (PDF) for the F-35 have taken an alarming cost rise since the FY2009 budget.

To be fair, much of that is due to leadership and management incompetence on the part of the DOD F-35 program office and the prime vendor, Lockheed Martin. Because there are so many significant engineering defects, real costs in the program are unknown.

The USAF is an important measure of F-35 procurement health. It is on record as the biggest potential buyer at 1763 aircraft. The USAF F-35A variant is also similar to what most foreign partner nations hoped to buy.

If the USAF large volume buy is in trouble, so is everyone else.

For the FY2009 budget, USAF predicted that each aircraft purchased that year (we will use weapons system cost) would be $226M. Then, USAF predicted it would pay $100M for each F-35 in FY2013.

The recently released USAF budget prediction shows that for FY2013, the service expects to pay $181M for each F-35. A cost rise of $81M each from the FY2009 prediction.

In FY2009, the USAF expected to pay $172 billion for 1763 F-35s. For FY2013, the USAF predicts that 1763 F-35s will cost $212B; $40B over the FY2009 prediction.

In FY2009, USAF predicted the average cost of each aircraft would be $90M over the span of the total buy of 1763 aircraft. For FY2013, the USAF expects to pay $120M as an average cost of each F-35 for the programs buy of 1763 aircraft. This rise of 30% in just 4 years spells trouble.

If the USAF wants to stay on budget in relation to its FY2009 prediction, it would have to cut 529 aircraft; leaving 1234 F-35s for the USAFs total program buy.

Where will we be in another 4 years? What will future USAF leaders think of their predecessors when having to budget for a significant tac-air short-fall?

“It’s about $37 million for the CTOL aircraft, which is the air force variant.”
- Colonel Dwyer Dennis, U.S. JSF Program Office, 2002-

Award winner

2012-02-18T00:05:00.000+11:00

And the rent-seeker award of the week goes to...

NACC continues the cover-up

2012-02-17T07:23:00.000+11:00

Israel is worried about their F-35 decision. Unlike Canada or the U.S., they cannot spare any dead-weight in their force structure.

Australia on the other hand is clueless. They may still go forward with buying two mistake-jets. They don't know what it will cost.

All this time, Australia's New Air Combat Capability (NACC) office have been doing a job on ministers; covering up the failings of the program. Hint: It isn't "fifth-generation" unless one considers ushering in a new era of defence procurement failure as progress.

Today, the government is in serious debt. Defence procurement incompetence can no longer be tolerated. Even our neighbor--who no longer has fighter jets--knows what is going on.

I wonder when the NACC office will join the team and do what is right for Australia?

Canada's F-35 debacle (procurement and sustainment)

2012-02-16T12:57:00.001+11:00

The current Canadian leadership claims of F-35 program viability are easy to shoot down. One of the big reasons being that there are so many significant engineering faults with the design making it near-impossible to compare with a jet that actually works.

Also the government is hinting that the acquisition of a CF-18 replacement has to fall within the budget of $16B; including 30 years of support.

A chart below is more close to the real picture of things if the DND has to have their 65 mistake-jets.

(Red figure for O&S is $30k per hour per airframe for 300 hours per year)

And how many defective F-35s can be fielded (properly) for $16B? With the cost trends rising; 20? 25? And it is doubtful they will have any more value than the current submarine debacle.

Another portrait of DND procurement management impotence.

F-15 Boeing strike eagle / silent eagle specs from Singapore air show

2012-02-15T18:56:00.006+11:00

Here is some interesting reading for the F-15 strike eagle / silent eagle path.

New AIM-120D motor production slow down--JDRADM cancelled

2012-02-15T15:11:00.000+11:00

As mentioned here, the AIM-120 price in the DOD's proposed FY2013 budget has gone into the stratosphere.

More on the story here.

Also, JDRADM, which was supposed to be a dual-role missile is gone.

Van Buren said the quality of the missiles that have been delivered is “fine,” but the weapons can’t be produced in quantity due to a high rejection rate for the rocket motors being built.

“I wouldn’t characterize it as a defect, I would characterize it as a through-put issue,” he said. “The through-put of acceptable motors is not meeting production schedules.”

But the Pentagon must have the new AMRAAM variant.

“The AMRAAM is a critical part of the air-to-air mission,” Van Buren said.

The next-generation Joint Dual-Role Air Dominance Missile, which would have replaced both the AMRAAM and the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation missile, which is used to suppress enemy air defenses, has been terminated because it was unaffordable.

Italy reduces F-35 order by 40

2012-02-15T13:09:00.000+11:00

Italy has reduced their order of F-35s by 40.

Cost is the main reason cited however why did that cost go up?

It went up because of significant incompetence in the area of F-35 program leadership and management which has produced a raft of defects yet to be fixed.

U.S. Navy not serious about cutting budget or improving capability

2012-02-15T07:37:00.001+11:00

The power of lobbying. It is one of the reasons the faulty Littoral Combat Ship is still allowed to breath air in the recent DOD FY2013 budget submission. The other reason is that there are 4 stars promoted way above their ability who don't want to be proven wrong. These things will be the weights that drag Navy combat capability down.

4 LCS will be funded.

Meanwhile the Navy will dramatically cut the Joint High Speed Vessel; ordering only 1 in this budget.

At $189M each, the JHSV makes more sense for the Pacific strategy backed by Washington. This vessel would be a huge benefit in low-intensity scenarios throughout the South-Pacific, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia.

Killing the LCS and F-35C requirement gives the U.S. Navy money to spend on platforms that can actually contribute to U.S. power projection.

Uninspired garbage, comes at a price

2012-02-14T20:59:00.000+11:00

From DOD´s proposed FY2013 budget.

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Not believable

2012-02-14T20:47:00.000+11:00

True lies; true nonsense.

According to Bolton, funding also remains in place for the F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter -- the centerpiece for future modernization to be able to prevail in contested environments.

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) price blow-out in FY2013 DOD budget

2012-02-14T13:59:00.000+11:00

This is a follow up to the post the other day on the high cost of things.

I just saw the numbers for the proposed FY2013 defense budget from DOD on the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) and was shocked. Granted they are also working on an SDBII which is more complex, but if we keep going at this rate, we won't be able to afford a war because:

1. We are already in grave debt.
2. Munitions are so expensive that we can only afford less of them.
3. While precision guided munitions are efficient; that works only to a point.

The Small Diameter Bomb was going to cost around 50K each. Pricey, but over time we would hope the price goes down. It was to do a few things:

1. Be low collateral.
2. Penetrate like a 2000lb BLU-109 forged steel pointy tip.
2. But just as important, allow an aircraft to carry more weapons per sortie because it was light and small and there are a wide range of target-sets that can die by a precisely placed small warhead.
3. Be a stand-off weapon to put the launching platform at less risk.

For low threat wars it is a non-starter. The U.S. Navy solved the low collateral problem by taking a 500 pound class dumb bomb (BLU-111), and removing some of the explosive filler and replacing it with ballast so that when mated to a Paveway laser-guided kit, it flew well with little explosive power. There have been other low collateral options like flying a Paveway with a training bomb (no explosive just cement ballast) into a vehicle or piece of equipment to wreck it.

USAF came up with a requirement for a special low-collateral warhead above and beyond the stock SDB, but at what price are we to follow this?

If you look at the proposed FY2013 budget, we are buying 144 SDBs this year.

At the cost of $291,666 each not counting R&D.

Unreal.

USAF moves 98 F-35s out of 5 year procurement plan

2012-02-14T09:31:00.001+11:00

Via Inside-Defense (subscription)-

Air Force Request Moves 98 JSFs Out of FYDP, Buys Fewer Reapers

The Air Force's fiscal year 2013 budget request recommends moving the procurement of 98 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft out of the current five-year defense plan, buying half as many MQ-9 Reapers as in FY-12, cutting two acquisition programs designed to build partnership capacity and continuing early research on a next-generation bomber, two senior service budget officials said this morning.

So much for "commitment". But they were not getting anything near "plan" anyway.

F-35 in the proposed FY2013 WH budget

2012-02-14T07:29:00.000+11:00

F-35 mistake-jets in the proposed WH budget for FY2013:

Victory for a second-tier strike fighter solution

2012-02-13T16:06:00.002+11:00

RAAF Super Hornets (good AESA radar foot-prints) and the Wedgetail (at whatever capability delivered) on deployment.

via Defence:

Super Hornets and Wedgetail arrive in Guam for
Exercise COPE NORTH

The Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) newest capabilities have soared over the coastline of Guam on their first overseas mission together for 2012 during Exercise COPE NORTH.

This is the first time the RAAF has participated in Exercise COPE NORTH, a bi‑annual exercise historically for the United States Air Force (USAF) and the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) that started in 1978.

The Super Hornets and Airborne Early Warning and Control Wedgetail aircraft, along with 300 Air Force personnel, have commenced the tri-lateral air defence exercise that allows the aircrew to enhance their tactical skills and joint operational capability alongside military aircraft from the USAF and Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF).

Six of the ‘Rhinos’ from Amberley’s Number 1 Squadron and a Wedgetail from Williamtown’s Number 2 Squadron have touched down at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, to participate in their first overseas deployment with the JASDF. It is the second overseas deployment for both the Super Hornet and Wedgetail since they were delivered to the Air Force.

Commander of the Australian contingent for the exercise, Group Captain Geoffrey Harland, said the exercise will provide excellent opportunities for RAAF personnel to integrate with a joint task force to learn how other countries operate.

“The training will be invaluable and there will be many important lessons learnt from our participation in this exercise,” Group Captain Harland said.

“Exercise COPE NORTH will allow the aircrew to develop an appreciation of the capabilities and strengths of the different aircraft types which is valuable training for air combat and Surveillance and Response Group personnel who may be required to operate in a coalition environment in the future.”

The international aircraft comprises the USAF’s F-16s, B-52s, F-15Cs, F-16CJs and KC-135, and JASDF’s F-15Js, F2s and E2Cs. More than 1,000 military personnel from around the world are expected to participate.

During Exercise COPE NORTH, Number 37 Squadron’s C-130 will also participate in a separate exercise on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The exercise will run from the 13 to 24 February.

Expensive tac-air stuff in the FY2013 budget proposal

2012-02-12T17:30:00.009+11:00

Take a look at the U.S. DOD FY2013 budget proposal. Some of these weapons systems used to be “affordable”.

The sample below represents the total acquisition cost for each item in the FY2013 budget proposal.

Back in the 1990's the JASSM was supposed to be an affordable cruise missile at around 400k each. Remember Powell complaining about bouncing rubble with million dollar cruise missiles in Desert Storm? Well, that "affordable' post Desert Storm JASSM is now shockingly high. At $1.57 mil each, it better be one heck of a target to be worth that money. And; the JASSM has had some significant troubles over the years performing up to any reasonable level....in highly scripted range events. Some recent tests have been good, but I wonder what will happen if a USAF general points to a bomber unit and has them do no-notice live-fire tests on different production lots gathering dust in the igloos.

The other part of that is that the accuracy of cruise missiles is always a tightly guarded secret. Hint; they didn't do all that well in Desert Storm, yes that was a long time ago, but I'm not so convinced on the bang for the buck. Granted it beats sending a pilot to a fixed target, but in the case of Libya, the air defense was so weak that it didn't require cruise missiles. It was more for show. A JDAM party would have been fine.

The JSOW now costs what a JASSM was supposed to cost. JSOW was supposed to be around the 200k region depending on variant.

JDAM was supposed to be around 18k per kit. Today those kits are 33k each.

The AIM-120 has taken a giant leap for defense contractor kind; well beyond the cost of the JA$$M.

I don't think I am getting that old. I am just a bit concerned about what we are buying.

Dumb naming of dumb ships

2012-02-12T14:04:00.002+11:00

Today, you can get shot, and get your name on the worst ship design for the U.S. Navy.

Progress.

USAF does not know a date for F-35 IOC; slows rate of procurement

2012-02-12T08:51:00.003+11:00

USAF will slow down its rate of F-35 orders. The service doesn't even know when they can declare IOC. Don't act shocked, the service is not displaying a bold leadership decision on par with Curtis LeMay.

Take it for what it is. This is a safe, bureaucratic move that goes with the flow. The F-35 program is starting to collapse under its own weight, so the timid can state that they will slow down procurement while pretending leadership.

History:

USAF was to order 110 F-35s per year when full-rate kicked in. As a result of the 2004 SWAT, this went to 80 per year for full-rate in 2006 and extending out the years. In 2008, USAF plans and programs declared they couldn't see a way to pay for more than 48 each year.

The take-away from this article is the following:

“That call is well into the future,” Schwartz said.

Of course. He will be retired by then. Let us not make any strong leadership decisions at the service level. Just continue to rake in that 4-star pay and benefits.

"With rank comes responsibility" is only uttered as a platitude in USAF HQ. It should read, "With rank comes responsibility to protect my job and any post-retirement employment opportunities."

A meeting of the deceived

2012-02-12T08:17:00.002+11:00

There will be a meeting of those that have been deceived.

This article has enough holes in it and errors in fact to drive a truck through it. However this is of interest:

But Canada has tentatively scheduled a meeting of the partners at its embassy in Washington before the Australian meeting to get an update on the program and better coordinate their approach.

Moronic statements like this don't help:

"They see progress in the test program and are scratching their heads why Washington is slowing down its orders," said one of the sources, who was not authorized to speak publicly. "If they're short of money, they should just say so."

Maybe if they re-read (or read if they have been asleep at the wheel) this letter one more time, the real status of the program might start to sink in.

For an alternate solution; the U.S. State Department is only a phone call away.

The JSF partner nations also have to take on-board the prime reason for rising costs and delay. That reason is defective engineering management and leadership

Operational Assessment

The JSF Operational Test Team completed an operational assessment of the F-35 program and determined that it is not on track to meet operational effectiveness or operational suitability requirements. The JSF Operational Test Team assessed the program based on measured and predicted performance against requirements from the JSF Operational Requirements Document, which was re-validated in 2009.

Australian Defence pushes more misinformation on the F-35 to the press

2012-02-11T14:16:00.002+11:00

Defence is misleading the press.

Again.

The F-35 cheerleaders are afraid that Smith will sign up for another order of Super Hornets. They think a preemptive strike in the media--which proclaims that the F-35 debacle is manageable--can't hurt.

Today's Canberra Times has a read that has the usual Defence talking points which are wrong. They are yet to figure out the following:

1. The F-35 is not a fifth-generation fighter (except in the dreams of marketing people)
2. The 2009 Defence White Paper is a joke.
3. The F-35 will not be able to take on modern anti-access threats.
4. The F-35 program has significant problems.
5. Some major U.S. political leaders are not happy about those problems.

A CF-18 replacement scenario for Canada

2012-02-11T13:13:00.004+11:00

My last off the cuff figure of what it would take for Canada to do a Super Hornet deal was stripped and not equipped. As someone suggested, it would be in the end, too low.

What would a real deal look like? Probably something like below. Interesting. Because it isn't too far off from the non-DND studies thrown about for an F-35 procurement (much higher than the Lockheed Martin talking point crowd). My scenario has support for 20 years and not 30 years. More; note the language that I used in the fake DSCA release below. It hints at an open competition for replacement of Canada's aging CF-18s.

Canada – F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Aircraft

WASHINGTON, August 8, 2013 – Today the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Canada of 28 F/A-18E Super Hornet Aircraft, eight F/A-18F Super Hornet Aircraft, 72 F414-GE-400 installed engines, a host of spare parts and munitions at an estimated value of $6.5 billion; with an option to purchase at a later date an additional 36 aircraft.

The Government of Canada has requested proposals from several foreign suppliers, including the United States, to provide the next generation fighter for the Canadian Defence Force. In this competition, the Government of Canada has yet to select the United States Navy-Boeing proposal.

This notification is being made in advance of receipt of a letter of request so that, in the event that the US Navy-Boeing proposal is selected, the United States might move as quickly as possible to implement the sale. If the Government of Canada selects the U.S. Navy-Boeing proposal, the Government of Canada will request a possible sale of 28 F/A-18E Super Hornet Aircraft, eight F/A-18F Super Hornet Aircraft, 72 F414-GE-400 installed engines, four F414-GE-400 spare engines, 36 AN/APG-79 Radar Systems, 36 M61A2 20mm Gun Systems, 36 AN/ALR-67(V) three Radar Warning Receivers, 144 LAU-127 Launchers, 44 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS), 144 AIM-120D Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), 144 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Missiles, and 36 AN/ASQ-228 (V2) Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) Pods. Also included are 36 AN/ALQ-214 Radio Frequency Countermeasures. 40 AN/ALE-47 Electronic Warfare Countermeasures Systems, 112 AN/ALE-55 Towed Decoys, 12 air-to-air refueling kits, Joint Mission Planning System, support equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, ferry and tanker support, flight test, software support, publications and technical documents, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

I propose that the second order of Super Hornets would be for 36 single-seat E models. A package very similar to above in content for $6.3B. Grand-total: 72 aircraft.

Operating and sustainment figures for 20 years will be for cost of flight hour only. I am averaging this out to $22k per flight hour; 300 flight hours per airframe, per year.

Grand total (not counting facilities upgrades) is around $22.3B to replace Canada's CF-18s with 72 Super Hornets including 20 years of basic operations and sustainment costs.

(ATFLIR on BlockII F-18F)

How will it end?

2012-02-10T21:32:00.001+11:00

Manage the failure now, or pay big later.

Moribund and dysfunctional.

`"The criticisms are inconsistent with years of detailed analysis undertaken by Defence, the JSF program office, Lockheed Martin and eight other F-35 partner nations," a Defence spokesman said.

More like years of detailed regurgitating Lockheed Martin talking points. Defence is so confident of their position that it is an unnamed "spokesman".

I like this:

Defence and industry sources have told The Canberra Times these concerns have been overstated and there is no reason to believe the 100 JSFs detailed in Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper can’t be delivered on time, on budget and able to do the job they were commissioned to do.

I think things are speeding up. The rate of doom that is. I figure the end will be something like below: It won't be pretty and the program will take some with it. All because of pig-headed pride.

WVR

2012-02-10T12:52:00.000+11:00

Friday.

Been a busy week so I haven't posted as much. One of Lexs' viewers found this interesting bit of history from the days of the old "Joint Strike Fighter": the F-4 Phantom.

Canada has to identify the root cause of their DND air power problem

2012-02-09T12:56:00.005+11:00

I applaud some in Canada who, more and more, are discussing alternatives to the failed project known as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. With that, the discussion seems to be in error when specifics of aircraft performance are mentioned; for instance, suggesting that drones can do air policing duty.

When looking at a plan-B to the F-35 one has to first identify all the problems before suggesting a solution. Paramount in the discovery process is noting that DND leadership either has no available skill-sets in the profession of air power or, senior leadership is ignoring the in-house experts (if there are any). This is the very first thing that has to be sorted out.

Next everyone has to come to grips with the fact that there isn’t a lot of money to spend on a replacement for the CF-18. Note that when the CF-18 was being considered years ago, aircraft like the F-14 and F-15 were ruled out because they were too expensive. Today is no different. Canada is a price-only buyer.

Another error I have seen mentioned recently are those crowing that the CF-18s had a recent refurb and are good out to 2020. This is a grave error. If the Canadian government does not start a solid replacement action for the CF-18s by 2013, there will be significant operational problems retiring these old jets by 2020. While the jets may have had some refurbishment, it is not a zeroing out of their airframe life hours. Time is short.

There is talk of the Super Hornet. No matter what; this will always be a second-tier fighter solution that will be unable to take on serious anti-access threats in the coming years. Yet, in every area of practical proven performance, it will beat the F-35 (even if the Just so Failed gets fixed). And, the F-35 will never be able to take on serious anti-access threats by the very nature of the requirement that was its blueprint.

I have thrown around very rough calculations (nothing serious) and figure that in order for Canada to go with the Super Hornet option, it would look something like this:

12x F-18F two-seaters

60x F-18E single-seaters

20 years operations and sustainment costs (300 hours per year per airframe)

Upgrade of facilities at 3 major bases and up to 8 deployable locations with in Canada

Weapons and spares

For around $13 billion dollars; not counting industrial off-sets.

I will defer to someone that has hard access to figures.

And while one can point fingers at this idea and state it makes no sense. It makes significantly more sense than committing to a disaster of project management (the F-35) based entirely on Lockheed Martin talking points.

A letter to Panetta

2012-02-08T07:26:00.002+11:00

Text of letter from Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) chairs Levin and McCain, to DOD boss Panetta, 6 Feb 2012 (original PDF at bottom of post).

Dear Mr. Secretary;

On Friday, January 20, 2012, without prior notice to or consultation with Congress, you lifted the two-year "probation" on the F-35B. the Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) originally imposed by then-Secretary Gates about one year ago. We are seriously concerned about the lack of notice and consultation.

When Secretary Gates originally decided to put the F-35B on probation, he intended his decision to invoke specific courses of action by Lockheed Martin and the program management office to help ensure that the F-35B program established technical maturity and design stability in several key areas. Have these actions been taken? If not, your decision may have foregone a valuable opportunity to continue driving desired improvements through the still-nascent, enormously challenging program to develop the F-35B. We believe that every opportunity to focus Lockheed Martin's attention and disrupt "business as usual" in this mullibillion-dollar effort, as Secretary Gates' probation decision had done, should be maximized.

For months, this Committee has insisted—most recently in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, under section 148, "Report on Probationary Period in Development of Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing Variant of the Joint Strike Fighter"—that the Deparlment define specific criteria that would determine how the F-35B would exit probation. It is unclear to us that the Department has done so.

Nonetheless, the Department's "F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency Quick Look," released on November 29, 2011, called for "serious reconsideration of procurement and production planning". And, just days ago, Department's chief operational tester reported that the JSF Operational Test Team (consisting of the Services' operational test agencies) assessed the F- 35 program as not on being track to meet operational effectiveness or operational suitability requirements.

We appreciate that the development of F-35B has enjoyed some success over the last few months, after several years of having fallen short. We similarly understand that engineering solutions to known problems with the F-35B's structure and propulsion have been identified.

However, in the intervening time since probation was imposed, more problems with the F-35B's structure and propulsion, potentially as serious as those that were originally identified a year ago, have been found. This is salient where the F-35B has completed only 20% of its developmental test plan to date. Your decision, therefore, appears at least premature.

The Department's hastily-prepared report on the F-35B, intended to fulfill the statutory requirement of section 148, was provided to the Committee only after you announced your decision. It purports to justify your decision by explaining that based on a "holistic view" of this weapon system "sufficient progress in F-35B development, test and production [has been made] such that no uniquely distinguishing issues require more scrutiny than the other variants of the F-35". Notably, this standard was never originally defined or articulated as the exit criteria determining the F-35B's removal from probation. It is. rather, now being offered as an after-the- fact rationalization of a decision already made.

For the foregoing reasons, we pose a series of question on the appropriateness of your decision, as itemized in the attachment. We would appreciate receiving answers to these questions as soon as possible.

Beyond the substantive concerns raised in that attachment, we are also troubled that we had to learn of your intention to remove the F-35B from probation from the press just hours before your announcement. This is unacceptable.

We strongly conveyed to you and your staff our concerns about learning first from the press of the Department of Defense's decision to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding on how it would procure the fifth block of low-rate initial production (LRIP-5) JSF aircraft while this Committee was conferencing with the House Armed Services Committee in connection with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 on the very same issue. In a similar way, we had hoped that section 148 of the Act would have made abundantly clear this Committee's special interest in the criteria for lifting the probation on the F-35B. We continue to be frustrated that the Department is failing to communicate with this Committee on key developments relating to this program and ask that you rectify this problem as soon as possible.

Thank you for your assistance with this Committee's oversight of this important program.

Sincerely,

John McCain
Ranking Member

Carl Levin
Chairman

-----

Questions on F-35B Probation

1. Did the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Developmental Testing; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering; the Director, Program Assessment and Root Cause Analysis; and the Director, Cost Assessment Program Evaluation (DCAPE) specifically participate in informing the "holistic view" that led to your conclusion? If not, why not?

2. Do each of these senior advisors, who have relevant and vital expertise needed to help you make important procurement decisions on a fully informed basis, agree with your decision to take the aircraft off "probation"? If not, why not? If there were dissenting opinions on lifting probation at this time, please provide the substance of those concerns to the Committee.

3. How have improvements to the design of the F-35B's auxiliary air-inlet doors, which Secretary Gates identified in connection with his original probation decision, demonstrated maturity in this variant's short take-off and vertical landing capability so as to warrant its early removal from probation—when the redesign is only now being installed on BF-1 and related flight testing only recently began in mid-December 2011?

4. How have improvements to the design of the F-35B's upper lift fan inlet door actuators, which Secretary Gates identified in connection with his original probation decision, demonstrated maturity in this variant's short take-off and vertical landing capability so as to warrant its early removal from probation—when a new actuator is only now in development and an interim design will not be tested until late 2012?

5.How have improvements to the design of the F-35B's FS 496 bulkhead, cracks in which Secretary Gates identified in connection with his original probation decision, demonstrated maturity in this variant's short take-off and vertical landing capability so as to warrant its early removal from probation?

6.How have improvements to the design of the F-35B's lift-fan clutch, which Secretary Gates identified in connection with his original probation decision, demonstrated maturity in this variant's short take-off and vertical landing capability so as to warrant its early removal from probation—when the risk associated with, and a path forward on, this propulsion problem has not yet been determined and a production cut-in for any redesign is not planned for any earlier than the seventh block of low-rate initial production aircraf (LRIP-7)? Do you agree that altering flight procedures for the F-35B and installing a warning indicator are inadequate as a permanent solution to this problem?

7. How have improvements to the design of the F-35B's lift-fan drive shaft, which Secretary Gates identified in connection with his original probation decision and which has undergone redesign twice already, demonstrated maturity in this variant's short take-off and vertical landing capability so as to warrant its early removal from probation—when the failure of the second redesign is only now being analyzed and corrective action is going on now?

8. Why is early removal warranted in the face of other, recently-discovered problems with the F-35B, including, the lift-fan door actuator support beam, roll-post nozzle doors and actuators, the three-bearing swivel nozzle door, the main landing-gear doors and the fuel dump subsystem—where design fixes are still being developed and, therefore, have not yet been integrated and tested to ensure stability?

9. In testimony before the Committee, the JSF Program Executive Officer Vice Admiral Venlet allowed for the possibility that the F-35B could establish technical maturity and design stability in less than the two years of the probation period, if it performed well in terms of unmonitored flight, ship trials, and in the incorporation of design improvements for STOVL capability.

a. How does the F-35B's limited performance with regard to unmonitored flight warrant its early removal from probation?

b. How does the F-35B's limited performance with respect to a single, limited- duration ship trial (conducted just this past October) warrant its early removal from probation?

c. How do the significant work and flight tests that are needed to verify and incorporate modifications to the F-35B and correct known STOVL deficiencies to prepare the jet for operational use aboard large-deck amphibious ships, which have yet to be done, warrant the F-35B's early removal from probation?

10. According to the most recent annual report issued by the Department's operational testing directorate, the F-35B's current and projected weight growth, which Secretary Gates cited when he originally imposed the probation, still threatens the ability of the F-35B to meet its vertical-lift bring-back requirement—a primary STOVL-mode attribute and a key performance parameter. As of November 2011, only 230 pounds of margin existed between the plane's current weight and its not-to-exceed weight. Why does this concern—unique to the F-35B—not warrant, at a minimum, keeping this variant on probation until more of the flight testing plan is completed?

11. How is your decision warranted while the development, integration and flight testing of the most complex elements of the F-35B's mission systems still lie ahead?

12. Given that a solution to negative flight performance characteristics that impact all F-35 variants, such as wing roll-off at high angles of attack and high-speed flight regimes, has not been developed and tested and that it is, therefore, impossible to know how such solutions will be integrated with the unique F-35B configuration, how has the F-35B demonstrated the technical maturity and design stability needed to remove the F-35B from probation early?

13. Given the uniqueness of the F-35B configuration, which has already introduced numerous technological and design challenges that impact its key performance characteristics, how can one assume that solutions to the recently identified flight characteristic problems will be seamlessly integrated from one variant to another?

14. Under LRIP-4, Lockheed Martin is expected to deliver 16 STOVL jets to the program—half of the total purchase of 32 jets under that block. But, we understand that, with only about 50% of the work under LRIP-4 completed to date, work under this production contract is expected to overrun substantially, particularly, when the cost of making changes driven by discoveries made late in development are included. At this point, the program office estimates that building jets under this contract will exceed the contract's target cost ($3.46 billion) by $245 million, and that "must pay" concurrency changes will require $237 million more—for a total of $482 million. How does this expected growth in the total cost of producing aircraft under LRIP-4, about half of which is comprised of F-35B aircraft, favor removing this variant from probation early?

Lifting "probation" on F-35B STOVL was a PR move-- SASC not happy

2012-02-07T10:13:00.000+11:00

Oh dear...I am truly shocked....

The top Democrat and Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee on Monday blasted the Pentagon's decision to lift a 'probation' imposed on the Marine Corps variant of the Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 fighter a year earlier than planned, saying the decision appeared premature and was not vetted with Congress.

DOD official--F-35 program "acquisition malpractice"

2012-02-07T07:02:00.002+11:00

Late last year, the top boss of the DOD F-35 office Admiral Venlet stated that the business plan for the program--based on concurrency--was a "miscalculation".

Not long after, a quick look report by top DOD officials found numerous problems with the program that would take years to fix.

Also, the top DOD test office released a damning report finding:

Operational Assessment

The JSF Operational Test Team completed an operational assessment of the F-35 program and determined that it is not on track to meet operational effectiveness or operational suitability requirements. The JSF Operational Test Team assessed the program based on measured and predicted performance against requirements from the JSF Operational Requirements Document, which was re-validated in 2009.

Today, Frank Kendall, head of weapons acquisition and development for the Department of Defense has said that, putting the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter into production before flight testing had started was "acquisition malpractice".

He covers himself with the boiler plate nonsense about:

Reaffirming the Pentagon's commitment to the program as "the future of tactical air" and echoing the conclusion of the Quick Look Review report, that "we don't at this point see anything that would preclude continuing production at a reasonable rate"

He goes on:

The program, Kendall said, had started with "the optimistic prediction that we were good enough at modeling and simulation that we would not find problems in flight test."

"That was wrong, and now we are paying for that," Kendall added.

The program is officially at the stage where massive problems can no longer be papered over. Senior DOD officials are now publicly saying things some of us already knew. The F-35 program is in trouble.

Canada's DND ignores some stark facts about the F-35

2012-02-06T17:29:00.000+11:00

More unproven nonsense from Canada's DND.

"The reliability of the F-35 systems, the decreased time spent on maintenance and the increased use of simulator training that is anticipated for this fifth-generation fighter will result in greater aircraft availability. Given this greater availability of aircraft, the Air Force will get as many operational flight hours with 65 F-35s as it does with the CF-18s."

Which is opposite from the reality.

Operational Assessment

The JSF Operational Test Team completed an operational assessment of the F-35 program and determined that it is not on track to meet operational effectiveness or operational suitability requirements. The JSF Operational Test Team assessed the program based on measured and predicted performance against requirements from the JSF Operational Requirements Document, which was re-validated in 2009.

Part of the story

2012-02-06T11:29:00.000+11:00

Despite smaller economy and population, Australia spends considerably more on its military than Canada does

Interesting. Now the rest of the story.

Australians pay a lot for defence. But because of gross incompetence at the Defence management level, they don't get a lot of value in return. Given Canada's sub debacle and the nonsense over the F-35, yes the two are similar.

AV Week--F-35 compromised to cyber attacks

2012-02-05T00:37:00.000+11:00

Various sources in an Aviation Week article indicate that the F-35 and some other programs have been a victim of cyber-espionage.

Before the intrusions were discovered nearly three years ago, Chinese hackers actually sat in on what were supposed to have been secure, online program-progress conferences, the officials say.

...and...

“You are on to something,” says a veteran combat pilot with insight into both the F-35 and the intelligence communities “There are both operational and schedule problems with the program related to the cyber data thefts. In addition, there are the costs of redressing weaknesses in the original system design and lots of software fixes.”

It is doubtful that there is that much that isn't known about the F-35 when certain forces of interest do threat planning.

The F-35 program may have been vulnerable because of its lengthy development. Defense analysts note that the JSF’s information system was not designed with cyberespionage, now called advanced persistent threat, in mind. Lockheed Martin officials now admit that subcontractors (6-8 in 2009 alone, according to company officials) were hacked and “totally compromised.” In fact, the stealth fighter program probably has the biggest “attack surface” or points that can be attacked owing to the vast number of international subcontractors.

There also is the issue of unintended consequences. The 2009 hacking was apparently not aimed at the F-35 but rather at a classified program. However, those accidental results were spectacular. Not only could intruders extract data, but they became invisible witnesses to online meetings and technical discussions, say veteran U.S. aerospace industry analysts. After the break-in was discovered, the classified program was halted and not restarted until a completely new, costly and cumbersome security system was in place.

As an aside, too bad that senate staffers don't have much of a clue how air power works:

“I think the biggest issue facing the JSF is that there has been a profound shift in the military’s perception of the value of manned aircraft compared to unmanned aircraft,” he says. “I’ve had long conversations with a Marine Corps forward air controller who has just returned from Afghanistan. He pointed out that an F/A-18 can be kept on call for 15 minutes, but an unmanned Reaper is there for eight hours. The day of the fighter pilot is over. There has been a seismic shift in the military’s value judgment of manned and unmanned aircraft.”

Now try that magic trick in a non-permissive air environment. It seems others are confused too:

The JSF and its mission of penetrating integrated air defense systems will not be threatened by unmanned aircraft despite cost issues, says a retired aerospace official who has been involved with the F-35 throughout its life.

Since the F-35 won't cut it against modern anti-access threats, the statement above doesn't mean much.

USAF's air power leadership deficit

2012-02-04T18:56:00.000+11:00

I love the USAF.

However, its senior leadership is way off the reservation on the definition of air power.

Despite production delays for the F-35, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley insisted the government remained fully committed to the program and to purchasing a total of 2,443 of the aircraft as planned.

'This is a must-do for our armed forces. It's the future of the fighter force, not only for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, but also about 12 other international partners as well,' he said.

We may be in trouble for the long term if this is not turned around.

GAO- F-35 cost per flying hour higher than rosy estimates

2012-02-04T09:35:00.001+11:00

One of the deceptions used to sell the F-35 program to Congress was that it would be cheaper to own and operate compared to legacy aircraft.

A newly released GAO report shows that the DOD's ability to report operations and sustainment (O&S) costs of major weapons systems is faulty.

Here is part of what the report had to say about the F-35:

"The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program office underreported the average cost per flying hour for the aircraft in the 2010 SAR. The average, steady-state O&S cost per flying hour was reported as $16,425 (fiscal year 2002 dollars). Program officials told us that the number of aircraft used in the estimate for the Air Force’s inventory was not accurate and the estimate also did not project for future cost growth above inflation. The estimate included approximately 528 extra aircraft that when calculating the average cost per flying hour, resulted in higher flight hours and lower average costs per hour. Further, according to the SAR, some of the F-35’s O&S costs were intentionally excluded from the estimate to enable comparison with the antecedent system, the F-16 C/D. Costs for support equipment replacement, modifications, and indirect costs were removed from the F-35’s cost per flying hour since they were not available for the F-16 C/D. Officials calculated that the revised cost per flying hour for the F-35 was $23,557 (fiscal year 2002 dollars), or 43 percent higher, after including the excluded costs, projecting for future cost growth above inflation, and correcting the number of aircraft. However, they noted that the total O&S life-cycle cost reported in the SAR for the F-35 was accurate because it was calculated separately from the average cost per flying hour."

By today's money, that is around $28786 per flying hour. Yet, we still do not have an operational go to war aircraft.

Back in 2010, NAVAIR had similar concerns over F-35 O&S costs.

Venlet (todays DOD F-35 program manager) was the boss of NAVAIR at the time.

Italy may cut 20-30 F-35s

2012-02-04T01:37:00.000+11:00

Like a cruise liner lead by an incompetent captain, Italy's F-35 program has run aground. Just that some refuse to acknowledge it. Best to call abandon-ship now while there is time.

Because when the program gets even worse it may be too late for those that were foolish enough to stick around to get out safely.

If only the program was building the right aircraft.

Italy will likely see 20-30 less F-35s due to program problems and the fact that the country is in financial trouble.

I figure they will probably lose more orders. Just a hunch.

The following quote from Flight Global about Italy's final assembly and checkout facility is interesting.

The site is earmarked to assemble and deliver around 80 F-35As for the Royal Netherlands Air Force in addition to those for Rome. It will also have the capacity to develop a maintenance, repair and overhaul and upgrade capability at a later stage.

A make-work jobs project of little benefit. The Netherlands will never see 80-some jets.

That is a lot of standing around and doing nothing for the final assembly and later refurb work.

But for now, the deluded faithful will follow the church in Cowtown.

A review of F-35 problems

2012-02-03T07:40:00.001+11:00

The F-35 program will be discussed for decades to come on how not to develop and field a combat aircraft.

Also, it seems that the concept of low-rate initial production is being abused by program leadership:

As a result of lessons learned from disasters with concurrency, in the 1960s and 1970s, procurement law was changed to prohibit full-rate production until testing was complete. Low-rate initial production (LRIP) was permitted during development. U.S. law stipulated that the LRIP total should cover no more than one unit of production-configured aircraft and be no more than 10% of the total.

A January briefing by Lockheed Martin shows how the rule-makers’ intent was set aside in JSF planning, with no fewer than 11 LRIP batches totaling 882 aircraft. Long-lead procurement was expected to start this year for an LRIP-7 package of 70 aircraft—which would have been the world’s largest fighter production program—in advance of full envelope exploration or the completion of fatigue testing. JSF leaders argued through 2009 that the concurrency risk was acceptable because improved modeling and simulation (M&S) would reduce the number of problems discovered in physical testing.

Procurement comparison

2012-02-02T07:47:00.000+11:00

So, India can run a fighter competition; pick a winner, and get 126 jets (with home industry agreements) for $10.4B.

At the opposite end of the scale you have Australia, who decides on graft and hope, and wonders why the POS selected by morons is in dire trouble.

You! Yes you, you...you....Naysayer!!!

2012-02-01T06:48:00.000+11:00

Too funny. The desperation of a Just So Failed cheerleader blames the internet naysayers.

Mark, the GAO, DOT&E, NAVAIR, those nasty, bad people that put out SAR reports as naysayers too.

I like the following. There is more here than what the writer may have intended:

When I grew up in the 1950s, America was in a period of greatness, dreaming great dreams and driving towards impossible goals. If we had the internet at that time we would have heard about the constant problems with Air Force, Navy and Army programs and the fundamental failures of the Space programs. Tests constantly failed, pilots died and companies failed in the quest for greatness. In the internet naysayer world, I am not sure this would have been possible.

The difference is today, a Kelly Johnson or Ed Heinemann would have been pushed out of the F-35 program for being:

Naysayers.

The worth of the A-10

2012-01-31T21:58:00.001+11:00

The A-10 has limits against high end threats. However, for everything else it is highly useful. Spent some time with an A-10 training unit many years ago and got a good look at the systems and capability.

Today, it is even more capable with E/O pods and modern precision guided munitions. Slow response for 911 CAS if it isn't nearby but then, nothing is perfect. You won't see the F-35 doing this anytime soon. If ever.

USAFs tail-spin

2012-01-31T07:36:00.003+11:00

Bankrupt thinking from the United States Air Force seems to be here to stay.

The USAF is getting rid of 5 A-10 squadrons in favor of the F-35. This shows poor air power thinking. The USAF has been woefully short of real air power leaders for some years now. This also highlights how a service that consumes up to $160B per year has trouble making ends meet. Scary.

The general quoted in the article somehow thinks that the F-35 will be combat capable in a multi-role environment but has no proof to back up that idea. The F-35 program is in deep trouble.

This quote from a recent government report makes things very clear:

"Operational Assessment

The JSF Operational Test Team completed an operational assessment of the F-35 program and determined that it is not on track to meet operational effectiveness or operational suitability requirements. The JSF Operational Test Team assessed the program based on measured and predicted performance against requirements from the JSF Operational Requirements Document, which was re-validated in 2009."

Even in the unlikely event that the F-35 ever gets fielded, it only carries 150 rounds of gun ammo. Experience has shown that ground troops still need strafing.

Someone got a bee in their bonnet about multi-mission aircraft having the only true value. OK, well, you have to actually field something that works to replace existing capability. What the USAF is doing is hoping that the F-35 works out with no proof to back up their pet theory. That makes their version of air power thinking just as dangerous to the defense of the United States as any enemy.

Current USAF leadership are ruining the combat capability of the service. It is time for our Congress to realize this and stop it.

Australia may delay 12 of 14 F-35s in initial order

2012-01-30T18:42:00.000+11:00

My latest for F-16.net: Faulkner's folly flounders.

U.S. Senator--Export F-35, 'not going to be the most advanced version'

2012-01-29T17:38:00.000+11:00

Besides the title of this post since the senator doesn't know much about the F-35, maybe he is wrong on that too?

Below is a PDF I created which challenges some of Senator Graham's theories about the F-35 program.

It is after all, an election year.

Rent-seekers should worry

2012-01-29T16:17:00.001+11:00

Some are just now waking up to the problem.If your business revolves around the F-35 program doing well, you are in trouble.

It means that most of the 127,000 supplier and subcontractor jobs promised by Lockheed Martin haven't materialized yet in Texas, California, Florida, Illinois and other states that desperately need them in a slow economy.

Most of all, it means that the Pentagon may fall well short of its initial pledge to buy 2,443 of the F-35s; that a dozen Allied and other foreign countries eager to buy the JSF could end up owning more combined aircraft than the United States; that instead of an anticipated hundreds of the jet fighters being deployed in the air by now, it will likely be 2016 or beyond before they join military operations.

I will go with "beyond".

However it was not "unforeseen".

A bucket for the just so failed

2012-01-28T10:24:00.000+11:00

A little history. The video below illustrates how the DOD and politicians treated the F-35 program up until big problems could no longer be papered over. The program has been consuming billions for years.

But even today, some of the F-35 Garçons still treat the program as if it has value; that it should be waited on with deference and that it should be fed.

Marine questions value of STOVL Harrier and F-35B

2012-01-28T09:13:00.001+11:00

A Marine has stated a different opinion compared to the party line.

The Harrier has surely been a large part of Marine aviation since 9/11, but its STOVL characteristics were rarely, if ever, critical to the conduct of operations. If anything, the capability was a liability when it came to the requirement for long on-station times, multiple ordnance options, and tedious scanning of compounds and cities with targeting pods in support of troops on the ground.

While Harriers have conducted some forward rearming and refueling at shorter strips, these were more driven by the Harrier's limitations and the desire to validate its expeditionary capability than a value added to the fight. That is, while a Harrier was rearming and refueling, a Hornet would be overhead, sensor still on target, refueling from a KC-130, more weapons still on the wing.

So, when the program hits a rough spot again, which I think it will, and when the budget adjusters come knocking, the Marine Corps needs to be honest about how much STOVL capability it really needs to maintain its close air support capability aboard amphibious shipping, how soon unmanned aerial systems can fill that gap, and what the best option is for the rest of our close air support needs.

H/T- Sky Talk

Here are some other thoughts I blogged last year about the limited value of STOVL jets at any price vs. how the U.S. fights air wars. And for the F-35B, consider 7 tons of gas per sortie from an "austere" base.

In every major conflict involving US ground troops since Operation DESERT STORM, the USMC Harriers have not been unique in their ability to “move forward” and operate “close to the fight”. For example, during DESERT STORM “Hornets based at Shaik Isa utilized the airfield at Jabayl as a FARP [Forward Arming Refueling Point], just as the Harriers did at Tanajib, thus reducing transit time to and from the target area”.
Furthermore, USAF “F16s…generated a tremendous number of sorties while operating from a forward operating location (FOL) at King Khalid Military City (KKMC) in Saudi Arabia, located just 60 miles from the Iraqi border”.

“F-16s operating there were able to exchange their drop-tanks for extra ordnance: KKMC-based missions carried four Mk-84 2,000-pound bombs (double the normal load of two). FOL operations allowed the wing to fly more sorties per day; KKMC missions launched from the…main base in Abu Dhabi to bomb the KTO [Kuwait theater of operations]; landed and rearmed at KKMC for a second sortie to the KTO (which did not require refueling); landed and rearmed at KKMC for a third mission and after attacking the KTO, air refueled to return to Abu Dhabi.”

Like the USMC Harrier, the USAF F-16’s took advantage of a FOL, but the “F-16 carried a larger payload than either the Harrier or the Hornet, and delivered tons of ordnance…with a very small transit and turnaround time”.

Again, nearly ten-years later, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the USMC Harriers were not alone in their ability to move forward and operate “close to the fight”. In October 2002, a six-airplane detachment of Harriers from Marine Attack Squadron (VMA)-513 set up shop at Bagram, near Kabul, where A-10s had been operating since March of that year.

Later during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Harriers took advantage of a FARP “at An Numaniyah, 60 miles south of Baghdad” but USAF A-10’s also “deployed forward” and operated out of “Tallil Air Base in Iraq”. However, logistics hampered Harrier operations. According to a “Harrier squadron commander…it was a major task keeping such aircraft supplied with jet fuel at that site”. This squadron commander went on to say, “It takes a lot of support and logistics…so we chose to use other platforms”.

Like the Harrier, the F-35B will be a logistics challenge. A number of logistics risks exist with the STOVL variant that do not exist for the other JSF variants, the primary being the vertical lift fan. Although a revolutionary design concept, the reliability and maintainability of the lift fan is still unproven. The lift fan operates on a single shaft that connects to the main engine and spins at a high-rate of speed. According to one study, this lift fan design causes “ added complexity” due to “the need for the clutch to engage and disengage the lift fan”.

Repair of the vertical lift components would very likely call for removing the engine, a traditionally “high repair time task”. Further, the lift fan and swivel nozzle adds to the logistics footprint especially when forward deployed.

According to one study, “While the JSF designers strive to reduce the complexity of the aircraft systems, the fact remains that the STOVL…will by nature be more difficult to maintain than either corresponding CTOL or [Navy] version”. This conclusion centered on “Naval Post Graduate School [studies] which compare projected component designs for the STOVL JSF to current Harrier design and projected [F-35C] design”.

Of course that paper assumes a working F-35C.

C-27J pushed out of U.S. DOD budget planning

2012-01-28T00:08:00.003+11:00

The U.S. DOD's newly released budget plan has heavy words for the light C-27J.

The new strategic guidance emphasizes flexibility and adaptability. The C-27J was developed and procured to provide a niche capability to directly support Army urgent needs in difficult environments such as Afghanistan where we thought the C‐130 might not be able to operate effectively. However, in practice, we did not experience the anticipated airfield constraints for C‐130 operations in Afghanistan and expect these constraints to be marginal in future scenarios. Since we have ample inventory of C‐130s and the current cost to own and operate them is lower, we no longer need nor can we afford a niche capability like the C-27J aircraft. The Air Force and the Army will establish joint doctrine relating to direct support.

Hardcore.

Faith

2012-01-27T16:14:00.002+11:00

The faith-based copy/paste Australian trade press. Some weirdness from this Feb 2003 article (PDF)

"But the whole point of the JSF program is to build an affordable aircraft - cost control is of
unprecedented importance compared with previous tactical fighter projects and the Pentagon, and Lockheed Martin in their turn, simply won’t be allowed by the US government to let the costs spiral out of control."

Because?

DOD boss statement on DOD budgets

2012-01-27T07:45:00.000+11:00

The DOD boss has spoken:

It is a balanced package, the secretary said, because while some programs are eliminated or delayed, others are increased. The budget looks to re-shape the military to be more agile, quick and flexible that incorporates the lessons learned in 10 years of war, he added.

The big “lessons learned” from Operations: USELESS DIRT 1 and 2 is that we wasted a lot of time and resources that could have been spent to give the military enhanced defense capability to fight real threats to the nation.

The budget treats the reserve components very carefully, Panetta said. After a decade of being an integral part of America’s wars, the reserve components will not go back to being a strategic Cold War-era reserve. The reserves will be the nation’s hedge against the unexpected, the secretary said.

Only a decade? He must have missed all of the Reserve and Guard deployments from the end of the Cold War until 9/11. Go back to sleep Mr. Panetta. Since the end of the Cold War, Reserve and Guard resources have been doing work that should have been done by a properly manned active force. When you have repeat cycles of Reserve and Guard foreign deployments they are really no longer a Reserve or Guard.

The Navy will retire seven older cruisers and two amphibious ships early, and the Air Force will eliminate six tactical air squadrons.

Not a bad idea, but their capability will be replaced by the Littoral Combat Ship, a technologically risky new variant of the Burke and the fighters will be replaced by a poor idea known as the F-35. None of this is what you want in the Pacific Rim.

The F-35 joint strike fighter is key to maintaining domain superiority,

No it is not. And with its ill-health, it’s future is doubtful. It takes money away from other needy and valid defense communities.

The budget will maintain all legs of the nuclear triad -- bombers, ICBMs and submarines -- and will invest in significantly more capability in the cyber world, Panetta said.

We need new nuclear weapons to replace the old stock. As long as Microsoft is used on prime DOD communities, the idea that one wants to fight a cyber war means there will be some unnecessarily messy battles.

“My hope is that when members understand the sacrifice involved in reducing the defense budget by half a trillion dollars, it will convince Congress to avoid sequestration, a further round of cuts that would inflict severe damage to our national defense for generations,” Panetta said.

The reality is: this is an election year. And, there is a lot more dead-wood to be cut.

"Sources" wishful thinking

2012-01-26T16:15:00.000+11:00

From the Canberra Times today. Also note that the number of cuts will probably be higher than what that paper reports.

The "source" below is of course dreaming. For instance, why should Australia order jets that are under-tested and riddled with problems which will not be solved until many years? The Japan deal is based on there being a stable design. Korea has removed the stealth requirement from their next-generation fighter replacement. Israel is not a sale in the traditional sense as they get $3B per year in foreign military aid credits from the U.S. This is a form of creative money laundering.

Sources have told The Canberra Times the impact of the deferrals on the JSF program could be mitigated to a large degree by orders from Japan, which has just chosen the JSF over the Eurofighter and the Super Hornet, South Korea which is close to making a decision on its next fighter, and other nations such as Israel.

Any deferrals could also expedite the production of Australian planes by opening up spots on the Lockheed Martin production line.

Current production F-35s are grounded for pilot training until further notice at Eglin AFB due to numerous safety concerns.

Proposed F-35 cuts for FY2013~FY2017

2012-01-26T10:10:00.000+11:00

Bloomberg is reporting that the proposed DOD cuts for the F-35 will see up to 179 aircraft removed from production between U.S. fiscal year (FY) 2013 to 2017 until the program sorts out technical defects.

The chart below gives you a snapshot of some of the proposed numbers.

USAF announces Luke AFB as preferred alternative for F-35 operational training

2012-01-22T23:54:00.003+11:00

USAF has named Luke Air Force Base, Arizona as the preferred alternative for USAF F-35 operational training. This could involve up to 6 F-35 squadrons and up to 144 aircraft.

Assuming everything works out for Luke, after USAF pilots get their initial training at Eglin AFB, Florida, they would go on to Luke AFB to get their operational training. From there they would go on to a front-line F-35 squadron.

Currently, the pilot pipeline for the F-35 is suffering delays due to safety issues with current production aircraft for use as initial pilot trainers at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. This means the initial pilot training effort at Eglin is grounded until further notice.

Of interest, Arizona Senator McCain would naturally be interested in this Luke AFB announcement. McCain is also the lead Republican chair on the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC).

Operation Pharos Cocos Islands 1944 - 1945

2012-01-21T23:57:00.000+11:00

(Oblique aerial photograph showing bombs exploding among transshipment sheds and jetties on Chatham Island, during a raid by Consolidated Liberators of No. 231 Group on Port Blair in the Andaman Islands.)

Nice photo essay with captions of allied air ops in the Cocos Islands.

A little known aspect of the history of Australia's Cocos (Keeling) Islands offshore territory in the Indian Ocean was the prominent role intended for it during the planned Operation Zipper, the joint invasion of South East Asia planned to retake Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies.

Panetta's false hope

2012-01-21T14:14:00.001+11:00

Don't get too close Mr. Panetta least you get entangled in the puppet strings. His speech today out at Pax gives the public false hope on the serious nature of the F-35 program.

"As a result of your hard work and the hard work of JSF's government and industry team -- and it's a tremendous team; I've had the opportunity to meet many of its members today -- the STOVL variant has made, I believe and all of us believe, sufficient progress so that as of today, I am lifting the STOVL probation."

What "sufficient progress"?

"It's not to say we don't have a long way to go; we do. We've got a long way to go with the JSF testing, and it's obviously not out of the woods yet. But I am confident that if we continue to do the hard work necessary, if we continue to do the dedicated work that all of you have been doing, that both the carrier and the STOVL variants are going to be ready for operations and are going to be ready for doing the work that they have to do, which is to help protect this country."

If something is "not out of the woods yet", what justification is there for lifting the probation? Who is advising this guy? This report shows that the whole of the F-35 program is far enough in the woods not to see sunshine.

"Secondly, we can't hollow out this force. We've made that mistake in the past. Every one of those draw downs I talked about, there were cuts across the board. They took big numbers, cut everything across the board, weakened everything across the board. That's hollowing out the force.

We are not going to do that."

By spending money we do not have on over-priced and under-performing weapon's systems we will do exactly that. Money wasted on the F-35 is money that can be better used for any other operationally relevant community.

"We know we're going to be dealing with a smaller force. It was going to happen regardless of the budget constraints as we were beginning to draw down. So we're going to be a smaller force. It's going to be leaner."

And with that, you can forget any peace keeping operations because those are inherently manpower intensive. We already experienced this from the end of the Cold War up to 9/11. This includes the fact that Operations: USELESS DIRT 1 and 2 have taken resources away from nuclear deterrence and numerous conventional deterrence capabilities.

As a review: 9/11 happened because of poor airport and airline security; poor visa control and agencies like the NSA having a raft of clues something was up but not communicating that correctly to national security decision-makers. The nation-building nonsense of OUD 1 and 2 ate up a lot of resources best used elsewhere.

On a side note, (get this) we need the F-35 STOVL because the Harrier is crucial to fighting terrorism. Can it get more silly?

Many news sources have given Panetta a free pass with the F-35B probation story. The lifting of F-35B probation isn't unlike giving false hope to a terminally ill patient.

New sub report ignores conflict of interest

2012-01-20T13:49:00.000+11:00

James Brown makes some great points about conflict of interest and a new sub report.

Before it was released, questions had been raised about the objectivity of this report. Its lead author, Brice Pacey, was formerly a strategic analyst for the Australian Submarine Corporation, the company most likely to benefit financially from a decision to build the future submarine in Australia. But this detail is missing from the report's author biography.

The report was sponsored by a coalition of ten defence industry entities, all of which have an interest in a future submarine being built in Australia. But nowhere is it mentioned that their sponsorship on this occasion was linked to this particular report, rather than to the Kokoda Foundation generally.

One of those ten entities is Defence SA, and it may be entirely coincidental that this report finds that the federal government should fund home-grown future submarines and a land-based propulsion test facility in South Australia. It may also be coincidental that the report was launched on the very same day the South Australian Treasurer is in Canberra to lobby Defence on those exact same issues.

It may be yet another coincidence that this 90-page report can spare only one paragraph for a cost analysis of nuclear propulsion, yet devotes 20 pages to advocating a greater role for private sector program management and recommends Defence 'engage private sector engineering and project management specialists', a service offered by one of the sponsors.

F-35 positive news scramble

2012-01-20T12:01:00.000+11:00

One of the F-35 friendly news sources is reporting that the probation on the F-35B STOVL imposed by Gates may be lifted. Pretty hard to believe.

The F-35 made a night flight; sort of. A big deal seeing as there were so many issues to work through. Burbage is trying to convince the less investigative sectors of the media that the tail hook issue is fixable and that performance on the F-35 isn't all that bad.

Then there is the usual from the delusional.

DAB is coming up and the F-35 true-believers need an appearance of progress in the news with a scramble of allegedly positive events . U.S. DOD boss Panetta will be visiting Pax. Jesus is coming. Everyone look busy.

Then there is the DOD discussions about the FY2013 DOD budget. Not long after, Congress will start hearings on the FY2013 budget, which will include a pre-release summary of the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on the F-35.

All with no milestone-B present.

2008 Navy League Briefing on the F-35

2012-01-19T18:35:00.003+11:00

Just a bit of history to review. The 2008 Navy League briefing on the F-35. Amazing claims.

LM admits to the laws of phyics

2012-01-19T14:26:00.000+11:00

Lots of loaded statements in this one.

I wonder if they will develop quick change horizontal stabs when they get burned up?

Even fully loaded, the F-35’s performance doesn’t change from its unencumbered configuration, he said.

Sounds great, but the fuzzy weight margins in all variants (operational empty weight anyone???) are paper thin.

But hey, we need a jet certified as safe for training pilots before that happens.

Different opinions on Australian sub roadmap

2012-01-19T09:05:00.000+11:00

Expert slams flawed submarines report

"Holland operates their European-designed submarines in both the Antilles and near Somalia," he said. "South Korea regularly deploys its submarines to Hawaii, something we seemed unable to do with our Collins class in 2010, not sending a submarine to RIMPAC [maritime exercise] for the first time in decades." He names eight different submarines, ranging in size from 1390 tonnes to more than 3000 tonnes, that come close to - or can better - the range of the existing 3350 tonne Collins Class boats.

And, off the shelf subs allow for more stability of crew training, scheduling and submarine maintenance time-lines. Off-the shelf subs can be an all-in-one solution or a bridge to a later effort once (if) home industry ever gets their act together with building subs at home.

On this issue, the rent-seekers need to be taken to task.

Lobbyists hired to help Cherry Point get their junk jet

2012-01-18T23:52:00.001+11:00

Sad but true. The rent-seekers want the F-35B, faulty or not. And they are bringing out hired guns.

(click images above to make larger)

Damage control mode

2012-01-18T16:29:00.000+11:00

Took awhile for the message to get out, but those that spin are now on the story. Even if they are not very convincing.

Aboulafia--who is about as accurate as a Vietnam era Sparrow when talking about mil-aerospace issues--thinks the YF-17 is the same issue.

Get out the popcorn.

Bad White Paper authors, Bad DMO, Bad sub ideas

2012-01-17T07:30:00.002+11:00

The last Defence White Paper was near worthless. Yet some still entertain the authors of that mess when they come up with nonsense like this.

There are good reasons to buy off-the-shelf subs to help in securing our Northern approaches.

1. Subs by themselves are not the answer. Air power is needed to protect anti-submarine aircraft. Surface ships have their use once air power is established. Off the shelf subs will be part of a useful effort to block sea lanes.

2. Real deterrence and long range strike comes from long-range air power. Defence threw that away on a lie.

3. Off the shelf subs allow us to have a stable training program for crews. We do not have that. No other plan offers that at a faster rate.

4. Any other specialty subs should be considered only after the sub community is healthy. It is not because of the Collins fiasco. It will never be healthy with the poor thinking that goes for a "son of Collins" as the way forward.

5. For all the money we spend on Defence we don't get much. Off the shelf subs offer the least management hassle until we kill off the experiment known as the DMO and/or reshape the logistics support tail to make sense instead of being a money pit of dead weight.

If only they did their homework

2012-01-16T17:44:00.000+11:00

Rent-seekers crafting a story that will never happen.

Fun reading of old air power studies

2012-01-16T15:51:00.000+11:00

Below are two studies that make great reading. One from 1999 and another from 1994.

They miss some things and hit some things perfectly. Compare to where we are today.

----

Way too much leadership bloat

2012-01-16T06:19:00.000+11:00

Unbelievable. We do not need this much bureaucracy to lead such a small Defence force. Too many civilians. Too many flag ranks.

The military has grown by 7000 troops - 13 per cent - and the defence senior leadership team has increased by 26 star-ranked officers, or just 17 per cent.

In 2007 there were just 82 top civilian executives and 152 star-ranked officers.

Last year the numbers had expanded to 134 civilian executives and 178 star-ranked officers.

While the number of one and two-star generals had jumped from 147 to 170 (15 per cent) in the five years, the number of band 2 and 3 civilian executives had expanded from 27 to 46 (70 per cent).

Former army officer Mr Robert slammed the bureaucratic expansion and described the 14 deputy secretaries within the department as "laughable"

APA's Kopp helps out with NCIS LA TV show plot

2012-01-15T04:36:00.001+11:00

Good story here on how Carlo Kopp from Air Power Australia helped out the TV Show NCIS Los Angeles with technical advice in an episode about E-bombs.

Cuckoo in the nest--U.S. DOD DOT&E F-35 report is out

2012-01-14T14:00:00.005+11:00

"Excellence is the enemy of 'good enough'", or so says an old F-35-JSF briefing. Another old briefing uses the term, “model acquisition program” and “affordable” in red. In looking at the report released today by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Director, Operational Test & Evaluation office, we can see that that the leaders and proponents of the F-35 program shot for mediocrity and fell short of the mark.

For your convenience, the report is presented below.

It is damning on a large scale. The report uses pithy language. Just putting that out there for some of the normalisation of deviance fans who may think, “well the truth may lie somewhere in between.” Where "in between" is a distance between reports like this and a Lockheed Martin press release. There are many less grey areas in the world of engineering. Poor management has made the F-35 program an outlier in every sense of the word.

It is hard to highlight the report because there are so many negative statements against the F-35 program. I will try a few.

Because of extreme difficulties, software block definitions are being lowered. Yet again. Some items that were supposed to be in one block are kicked down the road into the next one. The program has a history of this. Now, they are against a wall.

If you were not sure if Gates was right about putting the F-35B STOVL on “probation”, this report will tell you why. No amount of idiotic marketing by the USMC's General Amos can can paper over all of the engineering problems.

With most other designs, they put the engine in a position where its exhaust will not damage the aircraft. Because of center-of-gravity needs to meet the STOVL requirement the engine is located farther forward. The F-35 has its exhaust in a place that puts limits on what you can do with the aircraft (speed and sustained power) or you will burn off pieces of the horizontal stabs.

Brilliant.

Want some quotes? Hard to pick. Try this:

Operational Assessment

The JSF Operational Test Team completed an operational assessment of the F-35 program and determined that it is not on track to meet operational effectiveness or operational suitability requirements. The JSF Operational Test Team assessed the program based on measured and predicted performance against requirements from the JSF Operational Requirements Document, which was re-validated in 2009.

The program—as a reason to exist--is finished. Some of us are just waiting for those who are a little slow, to get a clue or two.

Hopefully an outcome from the failure of the F-35 will make various program leaders and politicians realise we have a lot of talent engaged in building the wrong aircraft. The fix is to reorganise that talent to build the right aircraft. It would be good if some decision-makers that are able to take this fact on board and lead a transition toward a recovery, stand up and make themselves heard.

Dutch Defense Minister now doing LM sales work

2012-01-13T15:17:00.002+11:00

Too funny. "Please let us all together buy this POS".

Korea drops stealth requirement for fighter buy

2012-01-13T07:55:00.001+11:00

Korea has dropped the stealth requirement for a fighter buy of up to 60 advanced aircraft.

I suspect they have seen through the "fifth-generation" fighter swindle.

Collins sham points to enemy within

2012-01-13T07:49:00.000+11:00

More of the usual. This article notes that there is little justification to believe what Defence and politicians say when they want to build 12 home-grown boondoggles with no credible skills to back up the effort.

ON August 28, 1993, Paul Keating launched the first Collins-class submarine. The fanfare was impressive. Led by the ABC, the media hailed the event as a triumph. But it was a hoax.

Steel plates were timber painted black. The engine had never been tested in salt water. The pipe fabrication was not finished. Nor was the design of the vessel itself. And the combat system didn't work. As the champagne bottle cracked, the gleaming submarine posed a greater threat to Australia's taxpayers than to its enemies.

Had Keating been the director of a listed company, the stunt would have landed him in hot water. Instead, the experience left a legacy of distrust about defence programs. Now a series of reports, all issued late last year, suggest that distrust is still merited.

SU-33 carrier ops near Syria

2012-01-12T22:02:00.001+11:00

Good video of Russian big SU-33 carrier ops off of Syria.

H/T- NOSINT

The rumour mill

2012-01-12T13:08:00.000+11:00

I wonder who is telling the Dutch Defense Minister that F-35 technical problems--as highlighted in the November 2011 DOD quick look report and elsewhere--are "rumours"?

Minister Hillen said he informed his hosts of the thorny issues regarding the purchase of the Joint Strike Fighter that are causing political headaches in The Hague: “The price, the rumours about technical shortcomings. Are they true, and if they are not: why is it that they keep doing the rounds?”

Eglin AFB parking lot gets first F-35B STOVL jets

2012-01-12T13:02:00.001+11:00

Read the press release. Funny as the pilot training program is grounded until they can conjure up a safe flying effort.

AM Harvey exits

2012-01-12T12:58:00.001+11:00

I don't know what all this means other than what is reported. Up until October 2010 Harvey was the boss of the NACC; along with its gross over-optimism on F-35 program health.

The 57-year-old, who joined the RAAF in 1977 and went on to serve as a navigator aboard Canberra bombers and F-111s, was apparently given ''five minutes' notice'' in August his position was being made answerable to one of the associate secretaries.

''He just wouldn't wear it,'' a colleague said.

U.S. Defense officials to meet for F-35 restructure

2012-01-12T07:44:00.002+11:00

A Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) effort will start next week to get a new restructure plan going for the F-35 program.

From this, we should have some new numbers on jet order predictions, cost and schedule. Timing of this is important because talks about the composition of the U.S. 2013 defense budget will start soon after.

A realistic meeting of the DAB has been delayed since the program's second Nunn McCurdy breach in 2010.

Just making shit up---defined

2012-01-10T15:27:00.002+11:00

Too silly to believe.

One idea is to attack an outer ring of enemy air defenses with F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, opening an alley for an F-22 stealth jet carrying sensitive surveillance pods to fly deeper into contested territory, where it could, for example, guide a powerful sea-launched cruise missile to a mobile or hidden target.

LM December 2011 Canada / Australia brief

2012-01-10T13:11:00.005+11:00

Below is a recent Lockheed Martin briefing that is dated in the middle of December 2011. (H/T-Spudman on F-16.net)

It is, as usual, overly optimistic. So much so as to be yet another deception from the sales force.

Also we have been blessed with 2 more Low Rate Initial Production Batches; up to 11. It was 9 and at the start of the program 6. All this due to defective management. Interesting because there is no recent Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) signed off on by Joint Strike Fighter Partner Nations. The most recent is 2010 (PDF). Many troubles have appeared since then.

Back in 2010 the F-35 program Milestone-B (a basic certification that allows it to exist as a normal DOD procurement program) was removed due to its second Nunn-McCurdy breach. DOD officials--as a practice of good management oversight--have not figured out how to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. There is no solid long-range plan.

A few highlights:

Slide 3-- LOL's for "Lower life-cycle costs", "Economies of scale" and "Counters Current and Future Threats". Interesting as the later needs definition. The job of handling high-end threats was for the F-22. That was always an assumption in the F-35/JSF requirement. Economies of scale are a dream at best. Life-cycle costs are also an interesting piece of creative writing.

Slide 4-- There are your 11 LRIPs and even a missing flag for the Netherlands. Most likely a typo with this crew.

Slide 5-- Doesn't mention that there are a lot of parked aircraft for any number of reasons relating to poor project management. This includes an already delayed pilot training program at Eglin AFB, that is effectively grounded until further notice due to safety concerns.

Slide 6-- Nice photo of a lot of people not working.

Slide 7-- On schedule but not compared to many previous schedules long busted.

Slide 9-- Serious over-optimism on most of those numbers. Big time.

U.S. Navy and U.K. Royal Navy F-35 unable to get aboard ship

2012-01-09T07:35:00.000+11:00

My latest for F-16.net

Fiction

2012-01-07T19:10:00.002+11:00

Here:

Acting Defence Minister Warren Snowdon said Defence was closely monitoring all aspects of JSF development.

Any delay in production numbers should not affect Australia's aircraft, he said.

Australia had approved funding for the first 14 JSFs, and the first two were still expected to be delivered in 2014.

Air combat capability was a vital part of Australia's national security, Mr Snowdon said. "The government will not allow a gap in our air combat capability."

Lead up to the JORD

2012-01-07T14:18:00.001+11:00

Just a slide from one of my all-time favorite JSF briefs (PDF). Note they keep putting the word "affordable" in there. Imagine that.

USAF--F-35 pilot training decision 2013 at the earliest?

2012-01-06T21:08:00.001+11:00

The reason for the question mark is that this is the only newspaper with the story. Do the words below mean that a decision on when F-35 flight training will begin will not happen until 2013; at the earliest? The USAF was after all the decision maker on this. The reason F-35 pilot training has not started thus far are technical problems with the jet such as unsafe fuel dumping, lightning issues and some other things.

EGLIN AFB — The limbo in which Eglin Air Force Base’s Joint Strike Fighter training school has been operating since it opened its doors has been extended.

The Air Force plans to reassess the impact of F-35 flight training and has postponed until 2013 at the earliest any decision on where the flight training will take place and which runways will be used.

F-35C Hook Location

2012-01-06T18:19:00.000+11:00

Deep thoughts.

Beazley blunder

2012-01-06T12:56:00.000+11:00

Nothing of what Beazley stated has much credibility.

The impact on the US's troubled Joint Strike Fighter program is still to be known but Mr Beazley said Australia was sticking to its consignment of 14 aircraft.

He said the Australian government will keep a close eye on the program and will take action should any risks develop.

"The Australian government will not permit an air capability gap to grow."

No risks there. None at all:

-Paper-thin weight margins in all three variants
-Unknown fatigue (they don't know what they don't know)
-Buffet which affects…
-The faulty helmet which cannot use…
-DAS (including replacement helmet does not offer full ORD functionality with DAS)
-Because of the helmet system failure (partly influenced by buffet in the heart of the combat envelop), weapons cannot be cued with the helmet including the gun.
-Airframe stress at Mach
-Flight limitations (dive limits) because fuel inerting can’t catch up.
-Associated lightning hazard
-Heat problems with the flight displays
-Cannot be flown at night.
-F-35C tailhook requires airframe redesign
-Wing rib replacement for A and B model
-Bulkhead problem with B model
-Various power-train issues with STOVL B model
-Fuel dumping unacceptable and requires a redesign
-Post flight logistics/maintenance data-link takes 30 minutes to download 1G of data. (1 sortie?)
-Severe limits in automated logistics management, (doesn’t fit into USAF skills training scheme), various components in the system (deployable server kits and other connectivity) do not work reliably.
-Production immature because of so many issues that are not figured out yet.
-Thermal issues affecting avionics and other systems.
-IPP (core system) has significant reliability flaws
-Many problems not expected to see proper resolution until 2016 at the very earliest.
-Leading to loss of defence deterrent for U.S. and allies
-Significant damage to worldwide industries

DOD future strategy

2012-01-06T09:14:00.000+11:00

A few points on DODs strategy statement.

Pretty thin on details. What would I do; considering the dire budget problems?

I think for the Army, the Regiment in the Active/Guard/Reserve has to be the core unit. It is smallish, and can be scaled as needed. Brigades? Divisions? Sure, when there is a need to form up several Regiments as needed for exercises and contingencies. Other than that, Brigades and Divisions (their footprint) becomes a small number of headquarters that are themselves small. Stressing the Regiment as the key player is important also be cause it is commanded by a Colonel. This means there is no general left behind act. We have too many flag officers.

The Guard Regiments would be very light and do the basics; provide homeland security and provide manpower for expeditionary Brigades and Divisions. Given that we have some small as well as large manpower states, I figure you could raise/reorg 30~40 Guard Regiments not counting aviation.

The Navy, like the USAF has to shed useless weapons systems. For starters, get rid of two systems that provide no real worth yet consume resources we can ill afford. That is: cruisers and the Littoral Combat Ship. Like it or not, carriers will have to be cut. We don't have the money to do everything. With that, the Navy should start on some new initiatives.

-New nuclear weapons to replace the old ones
-A new affordable no-frills Frigate
-A small armed transport. It will look like a small cargo ship, yet have a helipad and a hanger, small hold with crane.
-Keep building attack submarines
-Fund a new light carrier design which is nuclear powered
-Stop large carriers. The Ford will be the last one.
-Fund a new nuclear destroyer for the nuclear light carrier
-Continue to fund land-based ISR
-Cancel the F-35C, continue to by Super Hornets, fund FA-XX

Disband the USMC--we can no longer afford a second land Army.

Dramatically cut the USAF
-The Air National Guard will provide home air defense.
-Replace old nuclear weapons with new ones
-Continue upgrades of the C-5, F-22, and A-10.
-Cull the F-15E fleet and upgrade a smaller number of aircraft.
-Remove the F-15C-D
-Keep only F-16 Block 5X
-Fund Wedgetail as an AWACs replacement
-Fund other 737 types as manned ISR including a JSTARs replacement
-Join with the Navy on UCAS-N
-Continue to test Avenger
-Low rate buys of F-16s and F-15E
-Upgrade a smaller number of B-1s
-Remove nuke capability from the B-52
-Fund long range hyper-sonic strike from the B-52
-Fund a new ICBM
-Fund a small number of 777-200LR transports. Light transport to keep the aircraft's range. Will not have refueling capability.
-Fighters, Bombers and Tanker/Transport will be reorganized into single and dual squadron GROUPS. Like the Army's Regiment, this kills star growth yet is still doable.
-Cancel the F-35A

DOD wide--
Remove all air assets from Europe. Remove all land forces. We deploy and exercise there. Not garrison there.
Fund facilities and agreements with Australia for additional exercising of tanker, transport, F-22, F-15E and large bombers.
Change the retirement system into a 401k setup. Scaleable with years served. This also keeps people from chasing high-year tenure.

There is more but that is a start.

Third restructure for F-35 program in 3 years

2012-01-05T17:26:00.001+11:00

Although we will find out more tomorrow, there is news out there that the F-35 program will go through its third restructure in three years.

This could see the loss of another 120 jets from the immediate production time line. This is supposed to save $15B of US taxpayer cash from FY 2013~2017.

Given all the defects in the jet, building more was probably a bridge to far. Language in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees over the last several months seemed to indicate this was coming.

Of interest, Milestone B is still pulled since the programs second Nunn-McCurdy failure in 2010 and there has been no real DAB to recertify this mess to resemble a DOD defense program.

A DOD quick-look report from November 2011 showed significant technical problems still to be solved. For many of those problems, they will not see a fix as early as 2016.

An August 2011 LM brief showed that the current leadership of the DOD F-35 program have little confidence in how engineers were being lead and managed all these years. There will be a global engineer reorg finished sometime in 2012.

Some of the news sources have the usual boilerplate quotes about the US still committed to 2400 some F-35s. I guess at this rate, that fantasy program of record will complete sometime in 2070. Until then, Congress still hands out the cash as it sees fit.

Fabrication

2012-01-05T16:36:00.003+11:00

Given the raft of show-stopping problems with the F-35, how realistic is this June 2011 slide from the NACC? Interesting as so many problems with the F-35 don't have a hope of resolution until 2016 at the earliest.

F-35 Production Cut Update

2012-01-05T13:02:00.004+11:00

Assuming the F-35 program doesn't take more hits. The fantasy by some of great F-35 production just doesn't mean much.

Note the great "analysis" from Australia's New Air Combat Capability (NACC) office (read copy-paste from Lockmart). Still trying to figure out what--if any--value the NACC brings to the taxpayer other than mindless cheerleading for the seller of the aircraft.

(click image to make bigger)

Update: U.S. DOD announcement January 2012. The graphic below, representing yearly orders only going to 2016 as this is the year some--like Canada--state great advantage in F-35 price because of that year representing "peak production".

More alternate reality from the alternate universe

2012-01-05T00:09:00.000+11:00

The retirement of the F-16s, F-15s and A10s were accompanied by a slow roll-out of the F-35 program. Allied defections from the F-35 program, accompanied by a 40% cut in US numbers have slowed the program significantly with significant cost increases.

The F-35 program is not doing bad because people are not ordering it in numbers. It is doing bad because it is significantly defective.

F-35 program engineering reshuffle

2012-01-04T11:05:00.005+11:00

It appears that the F-35 program is engaging in a reshuffle of engineers and how they will be managed. A better explanation of this is here.

The grand assumption of the F-35 program had this as a goal:

Initial Operating Capability (IOC) dates

2010- USMC
2011- USAF
2012- US Navy, RAF, Royal Navy, RAAF

Happy 2012 everyone.

With that as a goal, the F-35 program figured they could reduce overhead by getting rid of a lot of design engineers. Unfortunately, the work needed by those engineers is far from done.

The graphic below is the latest from August 2011. We have been here before. It will probably slip. That is the consistent performance metric of the F-35 program.

(click image to make larger)

Here is the short-list of things (not all-inclusive) that have to be fixed before that chart has any hope of life:

-Paper-thin weight margins in all three variants
-Unknown fatigue (they don't know what they don't know)
-Buffet which affects…
-The faulty helmet which cannot use…
-DAS (including replacement helmet does not offer full ORD functionality with DAS)
-Because of the helmet system failure (partly influenced by buffet in the heart of the combat envelop), weapons cannot be cued with the helmet including the gun.
-Airframe stress at Mach
-Flight limitations (dive limits) because fuel inerting can’t catch up.
-Associated lightning hazard
-Heat problems with the flight displays
-Cannot be flown at night.
-F-35C tailhook requires airframe redesign
-Wing rib replacement for A and B model
-Bulkhead problem with B model
-Various power-train issues with STOVL B model
-Fuel dumping unacceptable and requires a redesign
-Post flight logistics/maintenance data-link takes 30 minutes to download 1G of data. (1 sortie?)
-Severe limits in automated logistics management, (doesn’t fit into USAF skills training scheme), various components in the system (deployable server kits and other connectivity) do not work reliably.
-Production immature because of so many issues that are not figured out yet.
-Thermal issues affecting avionics and other systems.
-IPP (core system) has significant reliability flaws
-Many problems not expected to see proper resolution until 2016 at the very earliest.
-Leading to loss of defence deterrent for U.S. and allies
-Significant damage to worldwide industries

Letters...we have letters

2012-01-04T10:42:00.000+11:00

December 2004 letter from LM's Mr. Burbage to the Dutch.

519 LRIP and 5500 full rate F-35s. That by the way seems in my opinion overly optimistic. When that is communicated to a layperson; it is potentially misleading.

Cut out the middle-man

2012-01-03T23:57:00.001+11:00

Second Line of Defense is still over-hyping the F-35 even thought it has numerous problems to get over before it can be fielded. The F-35 is years away from having much use.

Since the F-35 is so faulty, we can take the SLD fantasy farther with the low threat in places like Libya. We could use small corporate jets for networked manned ISR.

For instance, the Bach doesn't suffer the same thermal issues, and apparently doesn't suffer all the stuff-ups with the man-machine interface. The Bach probably has better mission reliability, not having problems with a faulty IPP or poor fuel-inerting system. And with a crew of flight-test engineers to run everything (including rebooting faulty mission software) we can have this new kind of "warfighter" trouble shoot design screw ups as they happen.

Uninspired, poorly project-managed and over-priced crapware can get to the "warfighter" sooner.

Sorry SLD, a flying lab does not indicate a heck of a lot of what the F-35 will be able to because the F-35 airframe has so many problems.

Keep up the gross disinformation though.

Fuel inerting and the F-35

2012-01-03T09:24:00.008+11:00

So the F-35 Lighting cannot go near lighting. Why?

Fuel interting is ineffective in the aircraft. This device (OBIGGS) is not doing its job.

Here is a good video explaining OBIGGS.

It is unknown how the fix will be performed. It could be one of the things that require a complete redesign.

Interesting words from various studies. There are different amounts of fuel tank inerting needs for various risk situations. Obviously, the one for combat jets is a more demanding requirement:

The U.S. military conducted fuel tank inerting tests and determined the nitrogen inerting
concentration limit was 9% oxygen (91% nitrogen). This limit was based on the threat of small arms fire up to 23-mm high energy incendiary (HEI) rounds. Studies of fuel tank inerting suggest that 86 to 90% nitrogen concentrations are required to prevent arcing ignition.One study indicated 84% nitrogen concentration is required to prevent hot-surface ignition. Another study provides data that suggests 82% nitrogen is sufficient to limit the flammability of methane and air mixtures. The FAA conducted tests to evaluate fuel tank inerting requirements for ground-based fires and found a range of fire protection from 9% oxygen concentrations up to 18% oxygen concentrations.

So, the F-35 can't meet the lower civil requirement for fuel-inerting.

What will 2012 bring for the Australian fighter aircraft roadmap?

2012-01-02T12:17:00.006+11:00

2012 is the year that the government is supposed to hand over real money for F-35s or some other idea. Defence Minister Smith—who is not happy with the F-35 program--has indicated as much. Part of the original Australian plan was that the RAAF would start getting F-35s this year. Now with all of the program trouble, they will be lucky to see them this decade.

Back in 2004, the new air combat capability office (NACC), stated that if the F-35 didn't pan out that we would start over.

So much for that idea because the word on the street is that there could be a commitment to purchase more Super Hornets. Sad because intellectual laziness can't replace logical considerations based in a tender process.

Time is short. It takes years to field a fighter aircraft into real squadrons. Fighters arriving in 2012 would have allowed the old legacy F-18s to retire with some kind of dignity.

The F-35 program will probably fail. If it does not, it is doubtful that an intelligent purchaser of military hardware can evaluate the design until 2020 at the earliest. This assumes initial operating capability for the F-35 in United States Air Force (USAF) does not slip further. IOC for the USAF is supposed to happen in 2018. Given another 2 years or so for tribal knowledge of real operators to grow and that is the time when you can really consider the worth of the F-35. Anything else is gross stupidity with the taxpayers money.

Australia no longer has a budget surplus like it did from the previous administration. There are also large budget commitments for Navy ships and subs. Any refresh of fighter technology will now have to be done over a longer time period. That is, unless someone can come up with an extra 200-plus billion to assuage the federal budget.

Below is a graphic I made up of one possible fighter replacement scenario. It does not fix the true problem of regional air domination. It only allows for Australia to have some serviceable second-tier strike fighter aircraft to use in conjunction with the US and other allies. It assumes short thinking on the part of Defence leadership with the fall-back being the Super Hornet.

It is possible that after an evaluation of the F-35, Australia may go in that direction. Because of all the problems, I doubt it.

So, about 2020 or so we do an evaluation of the F-35 program and either commit to it if it is mature and shows value, or move on to something else. What ever that is, I do not know.

Australia needs to start replacing legacy Hornets now. Australia can pay for the first batch of new single-seat Super Hornets and needed infrastructure by pulling the money from Faulkner's Folly.

Someone will probably trot out the comment that, "we have $16B committed to the New Air Combat Capability". Good luck with that idea in this budget climate.

It is sad that we have gotten to this point. It could have all been avoided; if only we had real air power leaders instead of useless bureaucrats. Until then, expect more misleading statements from Defence for 2012 about what a great job they are doing.

(click on image to make it larger)